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It is a striking fact that arguments which often eloquently call
for the decriminalization of "victimless crimes"1 rely on utilitarian
calculations aimed at ending either the pointless or positively
counterproductive waste of valuable and scarce police resources ex-
pended in the enforcement of these laws. The pattern of argument
and litany of evils are familiar. H.L.A. Hart, for example, in his
defense of the Wolfenden Report,2 makes the tactical concession
that some victimless crimes are immoral and then discusses in de-
tail the countervailing and excessive costs of enforcing the ends of
legal moralism in this area.3 In the United States, commentators
stress implicitly utilitarian pragmatist arguments identifying tangi-
1. Examples of illegal conduct sometimes described as "victimless crimes" are drug and
alcohol abuse, gambling, prostitution, and homosexuality. See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS,
THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 2-6 (1970); H. PACKER, THE LIMrTS OF
TE CRIMINAL SANCTON 266-67 (1968); Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 AN-
NALS 157 (1967). See also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 207.1-.6, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955); CoMMrrrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTON, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON HoMosEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (1957) [hereinafter cited as WOLFENDEN
REPORT].
2. WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 1.
3. See H. HART, LAW, LmERTY, AND MoRIrrY 45, 52, 67-68 (1963).
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ble evils that intangible moralism appears quixotically to incur.4
The core of these enforcement evils is that these crimes typically
are consensual and private. In consequence, the absence of either a
complaining victim or witness requires costly forms of enforce-
ment, including police work that is colorably unconstitutional,
often unethical, and eventually corruptive of police morals, for ex-
ample, entrapment.5 Such high enforcement costs also include the
opportunity costs foregone in terms of the more "serious" crimes
on which police resources could have been expended.' When these
costs are assessed in light of the special difficulties in this area of
securing sufficient evidence for conviction and of deterring the
strong and ineradicable motives that often explain these acts, the
utilitarian balance sheet condemns the criminalization of such acts
as simply too costly.
Such arguments proselytize the already converted and do not se-
riously engage the kind of justification to which proponents of
criminalization traditionally appeal. Such proponents may reply
that the mere consensual and private character of certain acts,
even coupled with the consequent higher enforcement costs, is not
sufficient to justify decriminalization, for many consensual acts
clearly are properly criminal, for example, dueling. Many noncon-
sensual acts are also correctly criminal despite comparably high
enforcement costs, for example, intrafamilial homicide which im-
poses high enforcement costs in terms of intrusion into privacy and
intimate relations.7 If there is a good moral reason for criminalizing
certain conduct, extraordinary enforcement costs will justly be
borne. Accordingly, efficiency-based arguments for decriminaliza-
tion appear to be deeply question-begging. The arguments have
weight only if the acts in question are not independently shown to
be immoral; but, the decriminalization literature concedes the im-
4. See N. MORRIS & G. HAwKuNs, supra note 1; H. PACKER, supra note 1; Kadish, supra
note 1.
5. See generally J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAw ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SocIETY (1966).
6. See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 2-6; H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 266-67;
Kadish, supra note 1, at 157.
7. For one statement in this form of criticism, see Junker, Criminalization and Crimi-
nogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 697 (1972). Cf. Kadish, More on Overcriminalization: A Re-
ply to Professor Junker, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 719 (1972) (supporting excess cost rationale).
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morality of such acts and then elaborates efficiency costs that have
little decisive weight8 absent an evaluation of the morality of the
acts themselves.
The absence of critical discussion of the focal issue that divides
proponents and opponents of criminalization has made decriminal-
ization arguments much less powerful than they can and should be.
Indeed, such efficiency-based arguments have not been decisive in
the retreat of the scope of victimless crimes, whether by legislative
revision or by judicial invocation of the constitutional right to pri-
vacy. In those areas in which there has been wholesale or gradual
decriminalization, such as contraception, 9 abortion,10 and consen-
sual, noncommercial sexual relations between or among adults,11
the most important basis of change has been a shift in moral judg-
ments to the effect that these acts, traditionally believed to be
morally wrong per se, are not morally wrong.1 2 In order to give
decriminalization arguments the full force that they should have,
we must supply the missing moral analysis. The absence of such
analysis has prevented us from seeing the kinds of moral needs and
interests that decriminalization in fact serves. To this extent, legal
theory has not responsibly brought to critical self-consciousness
that nature of an important and humane legal development.
This glaring lacuna in legal theory derives from deeper philo-
8. H.L.A. Hart does distinguish between conventional and critical morality but does not
explicate the latter concept. See H. HART, supra note 3, at 17-24. For puiposes of his argu-
ment, he assumes the immorality of the acts in question, and then makes various points
about the costs that strict enforcement of these moral judgments would inflict.
9. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. The Supreme Court recently upheld the refusal to extend the constitutional right to
privacy to consensual adult homosexuality. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901
(1976), affg mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court). There has been,
however, a gradual movement toward decriminalization of consensual sodomy by legislative
repeal. As of 1976, at least 18 states had decriminalized sodomy. See Rizzo, The Constitu-
tionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAm L. REV. 553, 570 n.93 (1976). A more recent
overview indicates that 21 states have decriminalized. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced
Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTNGS L.J.
799, 950-51 (1979).
12. I have tried to explain the nature of these changes in moral judgments in Richards,
Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights
and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 957 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rich-
ards, Sexual Autonomy].
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sophical presuppositions which the decriminalization literature ap-
pears often to assume: those of the utilitarian pragmatism associ-
ated with America's indigenous jurisprudence, legal realism. 3
American legal theory has been schizoid about the proper analysis
of moral values in the law since the publication of Holmes' The
Common Law1 4 in 1881. On the one hand, traditional moral values
underlying existing legal institutions have been "washed in cynical
acid"1 5 so that the legal institution may be analyzed without beg-
ging any questions about its moral propriety; on the other hand,
the enlightened moral criticism of legal institutions has been con-
ducted in terms of implicitly utilitarian calculations and has
sought to maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber.16 In discussions propounding the virtues of decriminalization,
this pattern of schizoid moral analysis is shown, first, by the dis-
missive concession of the traditional immorality of the acts in
question and, second, by the discussion of moral reform exclusively
in terms of efficiency-based considerations that lend themselves to
implicit calculations of utility maximization. These discussions
suppose that there cannot be any serious nonutilitarian critical
analysis of the moral values thought to underlie victimless crimes
simply because utilitarianism is presumed to be the only enlight-
ened critical morality.17
13. See, e.g., G. JACOBSCHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1977). It would be a mistake to regard legal realists as doctrinaire utilitarians when, in fact,
they were antagonistic to Bentham's ahistorical approach to jurisprudence. See, e.g., M.
WHITE, The Revolt Against Formalism in American Social Thought of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, in PRAGMATISM AND THE AMERICAN MIND: ESSAYS AND REviEws IN PHILOSOPHY AND IN-
TELLECTUAL HISTORY 41-67 (1973). See generally W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MovEMENT (1973). But the appeal to social considerations was, for them, implicitly
utilitarian. See Richards, Book Review, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 310 (1978).
14. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1963).
15. The famous appeal to wash the law in cynical acid derives from Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897).
16. See generally 0. HOLMES, supra note 14.
17. H.L.A. Hart appears to acknowledge the existence of a critical morality that is not
necessarily utilitarian, although he does not explore the content of this morality in his dis-
cussion of decriminalization. See H. HART, supra note 3, at 45, 52, 67-68. But see H. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSmILITY (1968), where he repeatedly insists that principles of fair-
ness and equal liberty, independent of utilitarian considerations, are needed to account for
the principles of punishment, id. at 72-73, and the form of excuses in the criminal law, id. at
17-24. For a striking attempt by Hart to construct a nonutilitarian theory of natural rights
from Kantian premises, see Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in SocIETY, LAw, AND
1981]
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Today the pervasive utilitarian presuppositions of American le-
gal theory are under attack both from within jurisprudence"8 and
from external developments in normative and moral theory. 19 In
moral theory, powerful philosophical objections have been made to
the adequacy of utilitarianism as a normative theory, and plausible
alternative theories have been proposed that better account for the
moral point of view. 20 In American legal theory, these general de-
velopments in moral theory are currently being harnessed to the
examination of the central place of moral ideas in American law so
that American legal institutions, like the countermajoritarian de-
sign of American constitutional law, inexplicable on utilitarian
grounds, are shown to rest on sound, nonutilitarian moral founda-
tions.2 ' This new and aggressive use of moral theory in the under-
standing of the normative structure of legal institutions is of gen-
eral significance in many areas of the law.22 In this Article, I shall
try to show the significance that such moral theory may have for
understanding one part of the substantive criminal law where
decriminalization has been urged and for converging constitutional
law doctrines invoking the constitutional right to privacy.23
Anglo-American criminal law theory has generally focused on
MORALITY 173 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
18. See R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITI-
CISM OF LAw (1977); Richards, Taking TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Seriously: Reflections on
Dworkin and the American Revival of Natural Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1265, 1331-38
(1977).
19. See A. GEWIRTH, REASON AS) MORALITY (1978); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971); D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971) [hereinafter cited as D. RICH-
ARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION].
20. The critique of utilitarianism was a prominent focus of English intuitionism, which
powerfully and persuasively showed that utilitarian concerns could not account for the con-
straints of equality and fair distribution or for the moral force of promising or gratitude. See
H. PRICHARD, MORAM OBLIGATION ESSAYS AND LECTURES 169-79 (1949); W. Ross, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF ETHICS 87-113 (1939); W. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 37-47 (1930). See also J.
SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST 77-150 (1973); authorities cited note
19 supra.
21. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRTICISM OF LAW, supra note 18, at 39-191.
22. See authorities cited note 18 supra. See also G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
(1978); C. FRIU, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978).
23. See also Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 12; Richards, Commercial Sex and
the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 1195 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Richards, Commercial Sex]; Richards,
Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law, 13 GA. L.
REv. 1395 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Richards, Human Rights].
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certain pervasive structural features of the substantive criminal
law24 but has not considered in any depth the question that is at
the heart of much European criminal law theory2 5-that of the role
of moral wrongdoing in the definition of criminal offenses. Al-
though general concessions are made that criminal sanctions prop-
erly apply to morally wrong acts,2 6 little critical attention is given
to how moral wrongdoing is to be interpreted as the necessary lim-
iting predicate for the proper scope of the criminal penalty. In par-
ticular, advocates of decriminalization bizarrely tend to concede to
opponents a conventionalistic definition of moral wrongdoing2 7 and
then to present utilitarian arguments about special enforcement
costs. To make such a concession, however, is unconditionally to
surrender the war. That legal theorists accept a definition of mo-
rality that, for a moral theorist, is quite transparently inadequate
is a mark of the unhappy separation of legal and moral theory.28
The recent reintegration of anti-utilitarian moral concepts into le-
gal theory enables us to reconsider these questions in a new and
inspiriting way. We now may critically investigate what should be
the central issue in a sound theory of the criminal law: the concept
of moral wrongdoing and its role in the just imposition of the crim-
inal sanction.
At the same time that such moral theory may clarify the real
moral basis and proper force of such decriminalization arguments,
it also may elucidate the Supreme Court's gradual, and not alto-
gether consistent, elaboration of a constitutional right to privacy,
24. Primary emphasis is usually given to such questions as the nature and role of the
requirements of mens rea and actus reus, the proper form of excusing conditions and justifi-
cation defenses, and the appropriate relation between inchoate and consummated offenses.
The classic text is G. WILLAMS, CRmMIAL LAw (2d ed. 1961). See also J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLSS OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1960); W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW (1972).
25. For a comparison of continental and Anglo-American approaches to criminal law the-
ory, with a focus on the role of Kantian moral theory in the former and utilitarianism in the
latter, see G. FLTcHER, supra note 22, at 406-08, 467, 530-04, 512, 577, 695-97, 768-69, 780-
81, 790.
26. See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 24, at 385. "It is pertinent to recall here that the crimi-
nal law represents an objective ethics which must sometimes oppose individual convictions
of right." Id.
27. See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9-13 (1965); see also G.
FLETcHER, supra note 22, at 568.
28. See Richards, Commercial Sex, supra note 23, at 1231-36.
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which the Court has used to achieve, by constitutional mandate, at
least some of the just aims of the decriminalization reformers. The
Supreme Court's deployment of the constitutional right to privacy
to invalidate the application of criminal sanctions to the use and
sale of contraceptives29 and abortion services" and the use of por-
nography in the homes1 is at one with the aims of decriminaliza-
tion reformers. On the other hand, the failure to extend the right
to consensual adult sexual conduct, both commercial 32 and non-
commercial,3 3 has led reformers to continue decriminalization ef-
forts, with some success,3 in the legislative arena. If moral theory
can clarify the general basis for such decriminalization arguments,
it should, pari passu, delineate the specific application of such
arguments to the constitutional right to privacy. If so, we may de-
fend the Court against the conventional criticism that the right to
privacy is constitutionally unprincipled and ad hoc 5 and yet also
critically assess the Court's past performance in the application of
the right and suggest the sound elaboration of its future develop-
ment.86 We also may address and perhaps unravel a critical puzzle
in this area: why should decriminalization sometimes be sponsored
by a countermajoritarian constitutional right and sometimes be
left to majoritarian legislative reform? Perhaps the answer is one
of a policy calculation of convenience in the Court's concern with
preserving its institutional capital.37 But before we impute such an
unprincipled motive to the Court, we must first assess whether
some line of principle can be articulated between cases properly
sponsored by the constitutional right to privacy and others left to
legislative reform. Even if the Court's practice does not conform to
this principle, it may be important to know that its practice is not
merely shabbily political but aspires, however inchoately and inco-
29. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
32. See Richards, Commercial Sex, supra note 23, at 1201-03.
33. See note 11 supra.
34. See note 11 supra.
35. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973).
36. See authorities cited note 23 supra.
37. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 129-170 (1980).
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herently, toward a defensible principle.
I propose to address these more general questions of both crimi-
nal and constitutional law through an examination of the moral
basis for the decriminalization of certain decisions to die. In terms
of the general legal literature on decriminalization, such arguments
were classically stated by Glanville Williams in The Sanctity of
Life and the Criminal Laws 8 using the terms characteristic of
decriminalization advocates, namely, utilitarianism. For Williams,
the only available moral contrast is between utilitarian humanism,
which would dictate the decriminalization of certain acts of eutha-
nasia and suicide, and a religious ethics, which requires such
criminalization.3 Correspondingly, legal critics of Williams' argu-
ments, like Yale Kamisar,'0 do not question his utilitarian argu-
ments of principle but raise practical problems of abuse which
should caution us against institutionalizing such arguments. It is
doubtful whether this sterile contrast between utilitarianism and
religious ethics exhausted the alternatives of ethical analysis even
when Williams first wrote; certainly, the Protestant theologian, Jo-
seph Fletcher,' 1 supported his arguments for the legitimacy of eu-
thanasia not on solely utilitarian grounds, but in terms of argu-
ments grounded in dignity and personhood. There is good reason
to believe that the utilitarian form of Williams' classic arguments
for decriminalization in this area rendered such arguments less
ethically powerful than they were and could be; for, if the grava-
men of the utilitarian's argument for a right to die is the simple
presence of a balance of pain over pleasure in a person and sur-
rounding persons, the inference is natural and was logically
drawn42 that the argument applied in full force not only to con-
senting and terminally ill adults (voluntary euthanasia), but to all
cases of persons suffering from a balance of pain over pleasure, in-
cluding those who do not and would not consent to die (involun-
38. G. WmLIMs, THE SANCTrITY OF LxnE AND THE CmiNAL LAw 248-350 (1957).
39. This way of drawing the distinction implicit in Williams' book was emphasized and
applauded by Bertrand Russell in a review of it. See Russell, Book Review, 10 STAN. L. REV.
382 (1958).
40. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation,
42 MNN. L. Rnv. 969 (1958).
41. See J. FLETCHER, MoRALs AND MEDicm, 3-34, 172-225 (1954).
42. Kamisar, supra note 40, at 1014-41.
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tary euthanasia).43 In light of recent anti-utilitarian moral theory,
we fundamentally may reconceive the arguments for the
decriminalization of certain decisions to die in terms of the rights
of the person which expressly disavow the manipulative utilitarian-
ism which Williams' account assumes.
Such an account concurrently should enable us to address the
issue of whether or to what extent the constitutional right to pri-
vacy should encompass certain decisions to die. In three striking
recent cases, In re Quinlan," Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz,45 and In re Eichner,46 state courts in
New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York, respectively, have in-
voked the constitutional right to privacy as the basis for vindicat-
ing the right to refuse certain kinds of medical treatment in ex-
treme cases of terminal life or illness when death was the likely
consequence. While the Supreme Court has carefully avoided the
task of clarifying the degree to which, if at all, its conception of
constitutional privacy encompasses a right to die in these or other
contexts,47 it must eventually-consistent with its constitutional
duty reasonably to elaborate constitutional values-articulate a
principled conception of the relationship of constitutional privacy
and the right to die.48 To the extent that recent anti-utilitarian
43. For recent forms of utilitarian arguments which appear to justify forms of infanticide
on such grounds, see J. GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LiVas 150-69 (1977) and P.
SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 122-26, 130-39 (1979). Both theorists sharply distinguish eutha-
nasia of a person who could consent and does not, which is not permissible, from the case of
a person who cannot or is not capable of consent, which sometimes is permissible. J.
GLOVER, supra, at 190-202; P. SINGER, supra, at 146-47. In the case of Glover, this idea rests
on a principle of respect for autonomy, which he employs as an important constraint on just
killing, J. GLOVER, supra, at 74-85, but never fully explains in terms of his general utilitarian
approach. Importantly, the principle does not apply to those incapable of consent, for exam-
ple, young infants.
44. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
45. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977).
46. In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184,423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979), modified and aff'd sub nom.
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
47. Certiorari has been denied in Quinlan and in a number of other cases where the Court
might have clarified the constitutional status of the right to die. See Anderson v. Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Jones v. President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Perricone v. New Jersey, 371 U.S. 890 (1962);
Labrenz Ill. ex rel. Wallace, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
48. For an argument that constitutional privacy does embrace a right to die, see Delgado,
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moral theory starts from the premise of the basic rights of the per-
son on whose protection American constitutionalism importantly
builds, it should enable us to grapple with these issues.
In order to deal with these matters sensibly, this Article will
have the following structure: first, a philosophical explication of
the proper scope of the public morals as a basis for criminal sanc-
tions, including an account of the role that human and moral
rights necessarily play in this conception; second, an application of
this analysis to the explication of the moral principles which define
the structure of the right to life; third, a critical examination of the
moral and paternalistic arguments for the criminalization of all de-
cisions to die; fourth, a statement of the case for the right to die,
its limits, and its proper effectuation as a form of the constitu-
tional right to privacy; and fifth, a discussion of possible limits on
the degree to which the full scope of the right to die may be en-
forced by constitutional privacy.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
In order to evaluate the kind of moral analysis necessary to as-
sess arguments for the criminalization of acts in a constitutional
democracy foundationally committed to ideas of human rights, I
shall first introduce an explication of the idea of human rights and
how recent deontological moral theory expresses this idea in a
sharply anti-utilitarian fashion. I then will suggest an analysis of
the "public morality" required by these values.
A. The Concept of Human Rights
Any coherent account of the ethical foundation of the substan-
tive criminal law and its connections in the United States to con-
stitutional principles must take seriously the radical vision of
Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17
ARMZ. L. REV. 474 (1975). See also Orbon, The "Living Will"--An Individual's Exercise of
His Rights of Privacy and Self-Determination, 7 LOYOLA U.L.J. 714 (1976); Scher, Legal
Aspects of Euthanasia, 36 ALB. L. REV. 674 (1972); Strand, The "Living Will" The Right to
Death with Dignity?, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 485 (1976); Survey: Euthanasia: Criminal,
Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NoTRE DAME LAW. 1202 (1973);
Comment, The Right To Die, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 613 (1974); Comment, Proposed State
Euthanasia Statutes: A Philosophical and Legal Analysis, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115 (1975).
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rights of the person that underlies the Constitution and its view of
the criminal law. The initial perception must be that the idea of
human rights is a major departure in civilized moral thought.
When Locke,49 Rousseau,50 and Kant5 1 progressively gave the idea
of human rights its most articulate and profound theoretical state-
ment, they defined a way of thinking about the moral implications
of human personality that was radically new.52 The practical politi-
cal implications of this way of thinking are a matter of history as
well as of continuing vitality today. The idea of human rights was
one among the central moral concepts in terms of which a number
of great political revolutions conceived and justified their de-
mands,53 and the idea retains its revolutionary vitality today as the
basic moral vocabulary in terms of which, in the international
sphere, colonial independence and postcolonial interdependence
have been conceived and discussed." One central application of
the revolutionary implications of the concept of human rights was
clearly the criminal law; a number of provisions of the United
States Constitution and Bill of Rights are preoccupied by it, 55 and
several provisions of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of Citizens" go beyond the United States Constitution in ex-
49. LOCKE, Second Treatise, in Two TRATnISS OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1960).
50. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DIscouRsEs (G. Cole
trans. 1950).
51. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1959) [hereinafter cited as I.
KANT, FOUNDATIONS]; I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (1965); Kant, Con-
cerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But Does Not Apply in Prac-
tice, in SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALrrY 159-72 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
52. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 12, at 964-72.
53. The political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed such
landmarks as the English Petition of Rights (1627), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), the
American Declaration of Independence (1776), The United States Constitution (1787), the
American Bill of Rights (1791), and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
Citizens (1789).
54. For a useful discussion of the force and currency of the idea of national self-determi-
nation in international law, see Franck & Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in
Very Small Places, 8 INT'L L. & POL. 331 (1976). See also Franck, The Stealing of the
Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT. L. 694 (1976).
55. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (clauses prohibiting suspension of habeas corpus, bills of
attainder, and ex post facto laws by Congress); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibitions of bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws by the states); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. See also U.S.
CONST. amends. I, IV, V, VI, VIII, (general provisions relevant to the criminal law).
56. See FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS, especially at IV, V,
VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI.
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pressly stipulating substantive constraints on the scope of the sub-
stantive criminal law, namely that people are to have liberty from
the criminal law "in the power of doing whatever does not injure
another. ' 57 Arguments of this latter kind became a prominent fea-
ture of Anglo-American conceptions of human rights with the pub-
lication of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty."
If the concept of human rights appears to have such pervasive
moral force, the philosophical analysis of human rights is of central
importance. Recent deontological moral theory, in particular that
of Rawls 9 and Gewirth,60 has enabled us to understand and defend
the force of human rights against the familiar Benthamite criti-
cisms.6 1 To be specific, these neo-Kantian moral theories focus on
the explication of the concept of human rights in terms of two fea-
tures: the capacities of personhood, sometimes called rational au-
tonomy, and equality.
1. Autonomy
Autonomy, in the sense fundamental to the idea of human
rights, is an assumption about the capacities, developed or unde-
veloped, of persons as such-namely that persons as such have a
range of capacities that enables them to develop, want to act on,
and, in fact, act on higher order plans of action that take as their
object one's life and the way it is lived, and evaluate one's life in
terms of principles of conduct and canons of evidence to which one
has given one's rational assent.6 2 Harry Frankfurt made this point
when he argued that the "essential difference between persons and
other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will."6 3
57. FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS IV. For the text of the
Declaration, see T. PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 133 (1976) (1st ed. London 1792).
58. See J. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1947)
(1st ed. London 1859).
59. J. RAWLS, supra note 19.
60. A. GEwIRTH, supra note 19.
61. See BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies: Being an Examination of the Declaration of
Rights Issued During the French Revolution, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 491 (J.
Bowring ed. 1962) (1st ed. Edinburgh 1843).
62. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 65-68.
63. See Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 6
(1971). For related accounts, see Dworkin, Acting Freely, 4 Nous 367 (1970); Dworkin,
Autonomy and Behavior Control, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23-28 (1976). See also Benn,
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Frankfurt argues that the difference between humans and animals
lies neither in having desires or motives, nor engaging in delibera-
tion and making decisions based on prior thought, because certain
lower animals may have these properties. Rather, the essential dif-
ference between humans and animals is that, besides wanting and
choosing and being moved to do this or that, persons may want to
have or not to have certain desires. As Frankfurt put it, persons
are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and
purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the
capacity for . . . "first-order desires" or "desires of the first or-
der," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or
another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have
the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in
the formation of second-order desires."
The cluster of capacities constitutive of autonomy include
human capacities for language and self-consciousness, memory,
logical relations, empirical reasoning about beliefs and their valid-
ity (human intelligence), and the capacity to use normative princi-
ples, including, inter alia, principles of rational choice in terms of
which ends may be more effectively and coherently realized. These
capacities make possible for persons independent decisions regard-
ing what their life shall be, self-critically reflecting, in terms of ar-
guments and evidence to which one gives one's own rational assent,
which of one's first-order desires will be developed and which dis-
owned, which capacities cultivated and which left barren, with
what or with whom in one's life history one will or will not iden-
tify, or what one will define and pursue as basic goals or what to
strive toward as an aspiration. Persons, for example, establish vari-
ous kinds of priorities and schedules for the satisfaction of first-
order desires. The satisfaction of certain wants, for example, hun-
ger, is regularized; the satisfaction of others is sometimes post-
poned, for example, delays in marriage in order first to secure
other objectives. Indeed, persons sometimes gradually eliminate
certain self-criticized desires, such as smoking or gluttonous appe-
tite, or over time encourage the development of others, such as cul-
Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person, 77 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOCIETY 109-30 (1976).
64. Frankfurt, supra note 63, at 7.
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tivating one's sensibility to love and tender mutual response. 65 The
mark of personhood is precisely our capacity to assess evaluatively
our lives in such ways: to come to see certain aspects of our lives as
irrational or a failure of competence or morally wrong, while in
other respects it is rational or competent or morally desirable, and
to take corresponding critical attitudes expressed in the uniquely
personal emotions-regret, shame, and guilt or self-respect, pride,
and sense of integrity.66
The idea of human rights crucially takes a normative attitude
expressing respect for this capacity of persons, as such, for rational
autonomy-to be, in Kant's memorable phrase, free and rational
sovereigns in the kingdom of ends,67 viz., to take ultimate, self-crit-
ical responsibility for one's ends and the way they cohere in a life,
including the capacity to evaluate and revise one's system of ends
in terms of arguments and evidence which express one's rational
nature.68 Kant characterized this ultimate normative respect for
the revisable choice of ends as the dignity of autonomy,6 9 in con-
trast to the heteronomous, lower-order ends-pleasure and tal-
ent-among which the person may choose. Kant thus expressed
the fundamental liberal imperative of moral neutrality among
many disparate visions of the good life: the concern is not with
maximizing the agent's pursuit of any particular lower-order end,
but rather with respecting the higher-order capacity of the agent to
exercise rational autonomy in choosing and revising one's ends.
The basic Kantian intuition, is that the central focus of ethics is
respect not for what people currently are or for particular ends,
but for an idealized capacity which people, if appropriately treated
consistently with the requirements of human rights, can real-
ize-namely, the capacity to take responsibility as a free and ra-
tional agent for one's system of ends, in short, personhood.
65. On the relation of the person to rational choice, including choices of these kinds, see
D. RICHARDS, REAsONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at ch. 3.
66. For an account of the bases for these personal emotions, see id. at 250-67.
67. See I. KANT, FouNDATIoNs, supra note 51, at 51-52.
68. Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, CAMBIDGE REv., February 1975, at 94.
69. See I. KANT, FouNDA'IoNs, supra note 51, at 53.
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2. Treating People as Equals
As regards equality, the idea of human rights expresses a norma-
tive point of view that puts an equal weight on each person's ca-
pacity for autonomy. Recent neo-Kantian moral theory alterna-
tively has articulated the idea of equality in one of three ways: (1)
in terms of equal concern and respect,70 (2) in terms of universal-
izability,7 '1 and (3) in terms of the political right that all parties to
the social contract be treated equally.7 2
The notion of treating persons as equals is, of course, ambiguous.
A fundamental way to distinguish among moral theories is to focus
on how they differently resolve this ambiguity. For example, John
Stuart Mill, following Bentham, argued that utilitarianism treated
people as equals in the sense that everyone's pleasures and pains
were impartially registered by the utilitarian calculus; thus, utilita-
rianism satisfies" the fundamental moral imperative of treating
persons as equals, where the criterion of equality is pleasure or
pain. To humane liberal reformers like Mill the great attraction of
utilitarianism was precisely its capacity to interpret sensibly the
basic moral imperative of treating people as equals in a way that
enabled reformers concretely to assess institutions in the world in
terms of human interests. 4 Any alternative to utilitarianism must
provide a coherent interpretation of treating people as equals
which also enables critical moral intelligence concretely to assess
institutions in terms of relevant consequences. The great challenge
to anti-utilitarian moral theory is to explain why it better expli-
cates the moral imperative of treating persons as equals in a way
that also supplies coherent substantive principles of humane moral
criticism of existing institutions.
From the perspective of neo-Kantian deontological moral theory,
utilitarianism fails to treat persons as equals in the morally funda-
mental sense. To treat persons in the way utilitarianism requires is
to focus obsessionally on pleasure alone as the only ethically signif-
icant fact and to aggregate it as such. Pleasure is treated as a kind
70. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 150.
71. See A. GEWIRTH, supra note 19.
72. See J. RAWLS, supra note 19.
73. See J. MILL, UTmrrAmmsM 76-79 (1957) (1st ed. London 1863).
74. See id. at 73.
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of impersonal fact, and no weight is given to the separateness of
the creatures who experience it. But, this treatment flatly ignores
that the only ethically crucial fact can be that persons experience
pleasure and that pleasure has significance and weight only in the
context of the life that a person chooses to lead. 75 Utilitarianism
thus fails to treat persons as equals in that it literally dissolves
moral personality into utilitarian aggregates. In contrast, neo-
Kantian deontological moral theory interprets treating persons as
equals not in terms of lower-order ends persons may pursue, plea-
sure or pain, but in terms of personhood, the capacity of each per-
son self-critically to evaluate and give order and personal integrity
to one's system of ends in the form of one's life. The fundamental
and ethically prior fact is not pleasure and the maximum imper-
sonal aggregations thereof, but so expressing equal concern and re-
spect for the capacities of personhood that people may equally de-
velop the capacities to take ultimate responsibility for how they
live their lives and revise them accordingly. It is no accident that
from Kant 8 to Rawls"7 and Gewirth 8 this perspective has been
supposed to justify human rights that are not merely nonu-
tilitarian, but anti-utilitarian. Thus to express equal respect for
personal autonomy is to guarantee the minimum conditions requi-
site for autonomy; ethical principles of obligation and duty rest
upon and insure that this is so and correlatively define human
rights. Without such rights, human beings would lack, inter alia,
the basic opportunity to develop a secure sense of an independent
self. Instead they simply would be the locus of impersonal
pleasures which could be manipulated and rearranged in whatever
ways would aggregate maximum utility overall, for all individual
projects must, in principle, give way before utilitarian aggregates.
Rights insure that this not be so, a point Dworkin has made by
defining rights as trumps over countervailing utilitarian
calculations.79
75. See Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILrruAN-
IsM FOR AND AGAINST 77 (1973).
76. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 51, at 59-64.
77. J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 22-27.
78. A. GEWIRTH, supra note 19, at 200-01.
79. R. DwoiIN, supra note 18, at 90-94, 188-92.
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B. Recent Neo-Kantian Theory and Human Rights
The task of interpreting human rights in terms of the autonomy-
based interpretation of treating persons as equals has been sub-
stantially furthered by the recent revival of contractarian theory in
the work of John Rawls and the similar neo-Kantian construction
of Alan Gewirth.
1. John Rawls
Rawls' contractarian theory explicates human rights and their
institutionalization in American constitutional law in a way that
the existing moral theories of constitutional theorists-
utilitarianism" and value skepticism8--cannot imitate. The great
early theorists of human rights-Locke, Rousseau, and
Kant-whose ideas clearly influenced American constitutionalism,
all invoked, explicitly or implicitly,82 contractarian metaphors in
explaining the concrete implications of autonomy and equal con-
cern and respect. The basic moral vision of these theorists was that
human institutions and relationships should be based on equal
concern and respect for personal autonomy or, as I have put it
above, on an autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as
80. The majoritarian appeal in Thayer, The Origin and Scope of The American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893), is implicitly utilitarian, as are Bickel's
later works, A. BiciL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); A. BicKL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
81. See generally L. HAND, THE BiLL OF RIGHTS (1958). Compare A. BicKEL, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 80, in which a value skepticism similar
to Hand's leads to a critique of moral reform through constitutional adjudication. Moral
reflection and reform in the light of principles are to be replaced by unconscious moral
historicism. Id. at 174-75. These ideas represent a significant retreat from Bickel's earlier
work. See A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). Value skepticism and utilitari-
anism are often inextricably intertwined in the work of these theorists. The idea, invoked
seminally by Holmes, appears to be that one is skeptical of any nonutilitarian ideas but that
utilitarian ideas are to be invoked in any proper analysis of the law. For the latter, see 0.
HOLMES, supra note 14. For a good statement of Holmes' value skepticism as a theory of the
first amendment, see his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). See also his famous dissenting observation, "The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82. Kant did not expressly invoke a contractarian model in the way Locke and Rousseau
did, but he clearly suggested it. See Kant, supra note 51. For Locke, see Locke, supra note
49. For Rousseau, see Rousseau, supra note 50.
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equals. The requirements of this moral point of view were ex-
pressed by the idea that a just society was one governed by an
agreement or social contract arrived at by the consent of all per-
sons starting from a position of basic equality. Rawls' con-
tractarian model has the great virtue of showing the continuing in-
tellectual and moral vitality of this kind of metaphor.
The basic analytic model is this:83 moral principles are those
that perfectly rational persons, in a hypothetical "original posi-
tion" of equal liberty, would agree to as the ultimate standards of
conduct applicable at large.8 Persons in the original position are
thought of as ignorant of any knowledge of their specific situations,
values, or identities, but as possessing all knowledge of general em-
pirical facts, capable of interpersonal validation, and holding all
reasonable beliefs. Because Rawls' concern is to apply this defini-
tion of moral principles to develop a theory of justice, he in-
troduces into the original position the existence of conflicting
claims to a limited supply of general goods and considers a specific
set of principles to regulate these claims.85
The original position presents a problem of rational choice under
uncertainty. Rational people in the original position have no way
of predicting the probability that they will end up in any given
situation of life. If a person agrees to principles of justice that per-
mit deprivations of liberty and property rights and later discovers
that he occupies a disadvantaged position, he will, by definition,
have no just claim against deprivations that may render his life
prospects meager and servile. To avoid such consequences, the ra-
tional strategy in choosing the basic principles of justice would be
the conservative "maximin" strategy:8 6 one would seek to maximize
the minimum condition, so that if a person were born into the
worst possible situation of life allowed by the adopted moral prin-
83. J. RAwLs, supra note 19, at 11-22. See also D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra
note 19, at 75-91.
84. J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 11-22.
85. If there were goods in abundant superfluity or if people were more willing to sacrifice
their interests for the good of others, the need for a moral system might be significantly
different or even nonexistent. For David Hume's remarkable discussion of the conditions of
moderate scarcity, see D. Hum, A TRnsE OF HuMAN NATURE bk. I, pt. 2, § 11 (London
1739), reprinted in SocmwrY, LAw AND MORALITY 307-19 (F. Olafson ed. 1961). See also J.
RAwLs, supra note 19, at 128.
86. See J. RAwLS, supra note 19, at 150-61.
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ciples, he would still be better off than he would be in the worst
situation allowed by other principles.
The choice of which fundamental principles of justice to adopt
requires consideration of the weight assigned to general goods by
those in the original position. "General goods '1 7 are those things or
conditions that all people desire as the generalized means to fulfill-
ment of their individual life plans.88 Liberty, understood as the ab-
sence of constraint, is usually considered to be one of these general
goods. Similarly classifiable are powers, opportunities, and
wealth. 9
Among these general goods, self-respect or self-esteem, a concept
intimately related to the idea of autonomy, occupies a place of spe-
cial prominence.90 Autonomy, seen now in the light of con-
tractarian theory, is the capacity of persons to plan, shape, and
revise their lives in accordance with changing desires and aspira-
tions assessed in terms of arguments and evidence to which the
person gives rational assent. As such, autonomy involves such es-
sentially human capacities as thought and deliberation, speech,
and craftsmanship. The competent exercise of such abilities in 'the
pursuit of one's life plan forms the basis of self-respect,91 without
which one is liable to suffer from despair, apathy, and cynicism.
Thus persons in the original position, each concerned to create
favorable conditions for the successful pursuit of his life plan, but
ignorant of the particulars of his position in the resulting social
order, would agree to regulate access to general goods so as to max-
imize the possibility that every member of society will be able to
achieve self-respect. Accordingly, self-respect may be thought of as
87. Rawls describes these general goods as "things which it is supposed a rational man
wants whatever else he wants." Id. at 92. The notion of rationality considered here is devel-
oped in D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 27-48, and J. RAWLS, supra
note 19, at 407-16. The general view of the good is discussed in J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at
395-452, and in D. RiCHARDS, REAsONs FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 286-91.
88. For the notion of a life plan, see C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 97-101, 155-82
(1970); J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 407-16; D. RiCHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note
19, at 27-48, 63-74.
89. J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 92. See also Richards, Equal Opportunity and School
Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32,
41-49 (1973).
90. J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 433, 440-46.
91. See D. RicHA ans, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 257, 265-68; R. WHrrE, EGO
AND REALITY IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1963).
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the primary human good.2
Thus Rawls' contractarian reconstruction provides an interpreta-
tion of the moral weight of autonomy-autonomy as a feature of
the primary human good-and equality-the original position of
equal liberty-and affords a decisionmaking procedure, the max-
imin strategy, which provides a determinate substantive account
for the content of human rights as minimum conditions of human
decency. An important feature of the contractarian interpretation
of autonomy is the assumption of ignorance of specific identity and
the consequent requirement that a decision be reached on the ba-
sis of empirical facts capable of interpersonal validation. This as-
sumption assures that the principles decided on in the original po-
sition will be neutral as between divergent visions of the good life,
for the ignorance of specific identity deprives people of any basis
for illegitimately distorting their decisions in favor of their own vi-
sion. Such neutrality, a fundamental feature of the idea of political
right,93 insures to people the right to choose their own lives
autonomously.94
2. Alan Gewirth
Both Rawls and Gewirth give expression to the autonomy-based
interpretation of treating persons as equals in terms of variant in-
terpretations of Kantian universalizability. Rawls does so in terms
of the veil of ignorance which enables the agent to abstract from
her or 'his particular ends, so that one captures the idea that in
thinking ethically one respects higher-order capacities of per-
sonhood, not lower-order ends which happen to be pursued, and in
terms of the idealized contractual hypothesis whereby what per-
sons would agree to therein comes to the same thing as what each
92. In Raws' terminology, self-respect is "the most important primary good." J. RAWLS,
supra note 19, at 440. See also id. at 178-80.
93. Dworkin, Liberalism, in PuBLc AND PRVATE MoRALrry 113-43 (S. Hampshire ed.
1978).
94. In later elaborations of his theory, Rawls has laid great stress on the primacy of the
argument for religious toleration as the paradigm for his argument. See Rawls, Fairness to
Goodness, 84 PHiL. REv. 536, 539-40, 542-43 (1975); Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Mus-
grave, 88 Q.J. ECON. 633, 636-37 (1974). The self-conscious primacy of religious toleration in
Rawls' theory is a striking correlate to the place of the free exercise and anti-establishment
clauses of the first amendment.
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person, thus idealized, would universalize for all persons alike.
Gewirth follows Kant more literally: he argues that ethical reason-
ing, as such, is marked by a certain phenomenology-namely, in
reasoning ethically, an agent abstracts from her or his particular
ends-thinking in terms of human action in general versus any
particular ends of human action, which turns out to be what we
previously called rational autonomy-and considers what general
requirements for rational autonomy the agent would demand for
the self, so idealized, on the condition that the requirements be
consistently extended to all other agents alike.9 5 Clearly Raws' ar-
gument is more abstract but to similar effect: we start not from the
particular agent, but from the concept of rational persons who
must unanimously agree upon, while under a veil of ignorance as to
who they are, the general critical standards in terms of which their
personal relations will be governed.
Both the theories of Rawls and Gewirth are deontological: the
idea of moral right is not defined teleologically in terms of maxi-
mizing the good, however defined, but in terms of certain princi-
ples which express the autonomy-based interpretation of treating
persons as equals." It is important to see that this kind of deonto-
logical moral perspective, while it rejects as an ultimate moral
principle the utilitarian maximization of the aggregate of pleasure
over pain, is not incompatible with the relevant assessment of con-
sequences in thinking ethically. Both these theories appeal to con-
sequences in arguing that certain substantive principles would be
universalized (Gewirth) or agreed to (Rawls). Thus Gewirth has ar-
gued that the universalizing agent would assess the necessary sub-
stantive or material conditions for rational autonomy and would
universalize these conditions; the consequences of universalization
thus determine what would be universalized. Correspondingly,
Rawls' contractors consider the consequences of agreeing to certain
standards of conduct as part of their deliberations.
The main substantive difference between these two theories is in
Rawls' argument that the contractors of the original position, in
the conditions of uncertainty-not knowing who they are and thus
how they will be specifically affected by agreeing to certain princi-
95. A. GEwutiR, supra note 19, at 48-198.
96. J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 30, 40.
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pies-would find it rational to maximin, viz., agree to that set of
principles which would make the worst off best off. Gewirth has
resisted the thoroughgoing application of this strategy on the
ground that, through the veil of ignorance, it too radically treats as
morally arbitrary differences between people not all of which can
easily be regarded as ethically fortuitous9 7 and thus properly regu-
lated by a principle like maximining which, in making the worst off
best off, tends to be equalizing, because, in many cases, the way
rationally to make the worst off best off is to abolish the worst off
classes altogether by mandating equality. We do not have to pur-
sue this disagreement here as its substantive upshot is in terms of
narrow issues of economic distributive justice which are not our
present concern. For present purposes it is important to keep in
mind the broad common ground shared by Rawls and Gewirth.
Even in the area of distributive justice, both agree about the jus-
tice of maintaining a social and economic minimum. Even as re-
gards their differences over maximining, it seems clear that
Gewirth's insistence, over a wide range of cases, that each person,
idealized in terms of rational autonomy, should demand for him-
self or herself whatever can be universalized to other persons con-
verges with maximining, viz., insuring that each person equally has
access to certain conditions of well-being and self-respect.98 With
respect to human rights, the consequence of both approaches
would be a set of general principles of critical morality, some of
which would involve such fundamental interests that coercion
would be justified in enforcing them.99 These principles, which we
can denominate the principles of obligation and duty, would define
correlative rights.100 Let us consider the relevance of this general
account of human rights to the analysis of the moral foundation of
the criminal law and related constitutional principles.
97. A. GE WIRTH, supra note 19, at 108-09. See also id. at 331.
98. See id. at 199-365; Gewirth, The Basis and Content of Human Rights, 13 GA. L. Rv.
1143 (1979).
99. For a contractarian derivation of such rights, see D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION,
supra note 19, at 92-195.
100. See id. at 95-106.
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C. The Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law
It is an uncontroversial truth that the criminal law rests on the
enforcement of public morality, viz., that criminal penalties, inter
alia, identify and stigmatize certain moral wrongs which society at
large justifiably condemns as violations of the moral decency whose
observance defines the minimum boundary conditions of civilized
social life.10 1 Little critical attention yet has been given in Anglo-
American law to the proper explication of the public morality in
light of considerations of human rights to which constitutional de-
mocracy in general is committed; rather, legal theory and practice
have tended to acquiesce in a questionable identification of the
public morality with social convention. 10 2 We are now in a position
to articulate an alternative account of the moral foundations of the
substantive criminal law, which can illuminate various criminal law
and related constitutional law doctrines and the proper direction
of criminal law reform.
The substantive criminal law and cognate principles of constitu-
tional law rest on the same ethical foundations: the fundamental
ethical imperative that each person should extend to others the
same respect and concern that one demands for oneself as a free
and rational being with the higher-order capacities to take respon-
sibility for and revise the form of one's life. Whether one uses
Rawls' maximining contractarian hypothesis or Gewirth's univer-
salization of rationally autonomous people, the consequence is the
same for purposes of the criminal law. Certain basic principles are
agreed to or universalized, as basic principles of critical morality,
because they secure, at little comparable cost to agents acting on
them, forms of action or forbearance from action that rational per-
sons would want guaranteed as minimal conditions of advancing
the responsible pursuit of their ends; furthermore, these principles
101. See, e.g., BUTLER, Upon Resentment, in FIFTEEN SERMONS AT THE ROLLS CHAPEL 102
(1913); J. FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DoING AND DESERVING 95-
118 (1970); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958); F.
STEPHEN, Punishment and Public Morality, in 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENG-
LAND 30-37, 90-93 (1883).
102. See Richards, Commercial Sex, supra note 23, at 1231-36; Richards, Sexual Auton-
omy, supra note 12, 975-99; Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Pri-
vacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1333-46 (1977).
[Vol. 22:327
THE RIGHT TO DIE
will be so fundamental in securing either a higher lowest (Rawls) 0 3
or the conditions of rational autonomy (Gewirth)104 that, in gen-
eral, coercion will be viewed as justified, as a last resort, in getting
people to conform their conduct to these principles. Accordingly,
these principles are commonly referred to as the ethical principles
of obligation and duty which define correlative rights.10 5
One fundamental distinction between these principles of obliga-
tion and duty is that some apply in a state of nature whether or
not people are in institutional relations to one another, whereas
others arise because of the special benefits that life in institutions
and communities makes possible; I shall refer to the former as nat-
ural duties106 and to the latter as institutional duties and obliga-
tions.10 7 With respect to natural duties, the principles include, at a
minimum, a principle of nonmaleficence' 8 (not inflicting harm or
gratuitous cruelty), mutual aid'0 ' (securing a great good, like sav-
ing life, at little cost to the agent), consideration "10 (not annoying
or gratuitously violating the privacy of others), and paternalism"
(saving a person with impaired or undeveloped rationality likely to
result in severe and irreparable harm). With respect to institu-
tional duties and obligations, the principles include basic princi-
ples of justice " which regulate such institutions-legal and eco-
nomic systems, conventions of promise-keeping and truth-telling,
family and educational structure-and, in appropriate circum-
stances, require compliance with the requirements of such institu-
tions," 3 for example, respecting certain property rights. All these
principles of obligation and duty-natural and institutional-are
formulated in complex terms, and priority relations are established
among them to determine, in general, how conflicting obligations
should be resolved and what the relative moral seriousness of of-
103. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 92-195.
104. See note 98 & accompanying text supra.
105. See note 100 & accompanying text supra.
106. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR AcTION, supra note 19, at 92-95, 176-95.
107. Id. at 27-175. See also id. at 92-95.
108. Id. at 176.
109. Id. at 185.
110. Id. at 189.
111. Id. at 192.
112. Id. at 107-47. See also J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 195-394.
113. D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR AcriON, supra note 19, at 148-75.
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fenses would be; the infliction of death, for example, is a more
grave violation of integrity than a minor battery.11 4 The general
nature of such principles and their derivation from the moral im-
perative of treating persons as equals, however, seems clear. Such
principles secure to all persons on fair terms basic forms of action
and forbearance from action which rational persons would want
enforceably guaranteed as conditions and ingredients of living a
life of self-critical integrity and self-respect; correlatively, such
principles define human or moral rights, the weight of which as
grounds for enforceable demands rests on the underlying moral
principles of obligation and duty which justify such enforceable de-
mands. Other moral principles are also agreed to or universalized,
but they fall in an area, supererogation," 5 which is not our present
concern.
In understanding the moral foundations of the criminal law, two
classes of these moral principles are relevant at different points: (1)
the moral principles which define the forms of action and forbear-
ance from action which the criminal law enforces, for example,
nonmaleficence, and (2) the principles of justice which regulate the
ways in which these moral principles may be enforced.
With respect to (1), the principles in question require forms of
action and forbearance from action which express basic respect for
the capacity of persons responsibly to pursue their ends. Such
principles impose stringent constraints on the kinds of action and
forbearance from action which permissibly may be made subjects
of criminal penalty; only those forms of action and forbearance
may properly be criminalized which violate rights of the person to
forms of respect defined by the underlying principles of obligation
and duty. Such constraints on the propriety of criminalization are
a salient feature of the perspective of human rights on criminal
justice, a thought expressed in the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of Citizens that people are to have liberty from
the criminal law "in the power of doing whatever does not injure
another '" 6 and by John Stuart Mill in terms of his harm princi-
114. For attempts to formulate such complex principles which appear broadly convergent
in substantive requirements, see id. at 8-10; A. GEWIRTH, supra note 19, at 199-365.
115. D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 196-211.
116. FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS IV.
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ple.117 It is easier to state this thought negatively, in terms of what
it rejects, than to formulate positively what it requires as substan-
tive conditions of the just use of the criminal penalty. Negatively,
this thought rules out, as the measure of proper criminalization,
the mere thought, no matter how conventional or historically com-
mon or sincerely held, that certain conduct is disapproved or re-
jected.1 8 Positively, the thought appears to require, as a condition
of just criminalization, a certain kind of moral reasoning rooted in
respect for the rights of the person. Later I shall argue that the
constitutional right to privacy, correctly interpreted, expresses a
form of this requirement and is thus rooted in the most basic ideas
of human rights on which constitutionalism justly builds.119
With respect to (2), the principles of justice, since the moral
principles of (1) are the proper objects of enforcement by forms of
force or coercion, ethical principles of justice that govern the
proper distribution of such force or coercion are agreed to or uni-
versalized. 2 ° Such principles include the general requirement that
sanctions be applied only to persons who broke a reasonably spe-
cific law, who had the full capacity and opportunity to obey the
law, and who reasonably could have been expected to know that
such a law existed. In this way, each person is guaranteed the
greatest liberty, capacity, and opportunity of controlling and pre-
dicting the consequences of her or his actions, compatible with a
like liberty, capacity, and opportunity for all. Such a principle can
be agreed to or universalized because it is a reasonable way to se-
cure general respect for and compliance with the moral principles
of (1) at a tolerable cost; for, these conditions provide the fullest
possible opportunity for people to avoid these sanctions if they so
choose or, at least, the fullest possible opportunity within the con-
straint that some system of coercive enforcement is justified to in-
sure compliance with the moral principles of (1).121 In addition, the
117. See J. MiiL, supra note 58.
118. See authorities cited note 102 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 343-59 infra. Compare Richards, Sexual Autonomy,
supra note 12, at 957-1018, with Richards, Human Rights, supra note 23, at 1421-28.
120. I discuss these principles at greater length in Richards, Human Rights, supra note
23, at 1416-20.
121. See id. at 1428-34.
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principles of (2) would include principles of proportionality122 and
effectiveness 123 which would place constraints on degrees and kinds
of sanction that may be used as just criminal sanctions.
II. THE MORALITY OF DECISIONS To DIE AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
PERSON
In order to assess critically the arguments for the criminalization
of all decisions to die, we must examine carefully the moral struc-
ture of the idea of the right to life which underlies such criminal-
ization. The concept of the right to life, like any complex moral
and legal concept, such as the right to property, appears to consist
of several distinguishable elements, 12 each having different impli-
cations and requiring separate analysis. First, let us examine the
cluster of moral principles of obligation and duty, sketched in gen-
eral terms above, which are constitutive of the right to life; then,
we may critically examine the proper force of various common ar-
guments for the criminalization of all decisions to die.
A. Moral Principles Constitutive of the Right to Life
For purposes of the present analysis of the moral right to life, let
us stipulate a common denominator of the idea of rights as such,
whether moral rights or legal rights-those enforceable by the civil
or criminal law. Having a right implies at least the justifiability of
coercion, in some form, in protecting certain kinds of choice from
incursion by others, whether the individual has the additional lib-
erty of choosing whether these rights shall be enforced, for exam-
ple, contracts in the civil law, or whether she or he does not have
that choice, for example, rights to personal safety in the criminal
law.125 In the moral sphere, such justifiability of coercion would be
crucially defined by moral principles of obligation and duty which,
by definition, justify coercion in their enforcement. Accordingly,
the delineation of the moral structure of the right to life requires
analysis of the pertinent moral principles of obligation and duty
122. See id. at 1418, 1442-45.
123. See id. at 1418-19, 1442-45.
124. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 2D SER. 170-
201 (A. Simpson ed. 1973).
125. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR AC7rON, supra note 19, at 99-106.
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which justify coercion in the protection of life. We shall focus here
on the relevant aspects of three such principles: nonmaleficence,
mutual aid, and paternalism.
In general, these principles define natural duties which apply to
personal relationships whether within or outside common institu-
tions.128 These principles thus do not exhaust the moral principles
of obligation and duty relevant to the full assessment of the moral-
ity of acts in general and killing in particular. To be specific, per-
sonal relationships within institutions and between institutions are
governed by principles of justice and fairness which regulate the
distribution of benefits and burdens of such institutions. 27 In par-
ticularcertain of these principles of justice will bear on questions
of the morality of inflicting harms. Principles of just punishment,
for e'xample, will justify certain kinds of infliction of evil in order
to uphold the just aims of the criminal law, 12  including the en-
forcement of the natural duties, 129 and the principles of just war
may, in appropriate circumstances and within defined limits, jus-
tify the infliction of harms consistent with measured aims of jus-
tice.1 30 In some cases such principles may justify forms of killing.
For present purposes, let us assume that some reasonable set of
such principles of justice have been formulated and that we have
confidence that some forms of the infliction of harms justified by
such principles are circumscribed within sharp limits of propor-
tionality and effectiveness. With such principles in the background
and assuming the justifiability of forms of harm infliction justified
by such principles, we may turn to the principles of natural duty
which establish and define a general moral right to life.
126. See id. at 92-95, 176-95.
127. See id. at 107-75.
128. See, e.g., Richards, Human Rights, supra note 23, at 1416-20.
129. The natural duties, by definition, apply to personal relationships, whether or not
persons are in an institutional relationship to one another. Persons, for example, would be
bound in their relationships in some state of nature to observe the principle of
nonmaleficence and the like. However, since the principles of natural duty are the justifiable
object of coercive enforcement when a just form of coercive enforcement exists-for exam-
ple, a nation-state with a just legal system-the natural duties are the subject of coercive
enforcement, for example, through the criminal law. See generally Richards, Human Rights,
supra note 23, at 1414-20.
130. See D. RiCHARDS, REAsoNs FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 137-41. See also C. BErrz,
PoLrrIcAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979); M. WALzER, JUST AND UNJUST
WARs (1977).
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1. The Principle of Nonmaleficence
The principles of natural duty are those principles, justifying co-
ercion in their enforcement, which would be agreed to or universal-
ized, consistent with the autonomy-based interpretation of treating
persons as equals, as an effective public morality governing the re-
lations of persons simpliciter, whatever their institutional relations
to one another. Foremost among these principles is the principle of
nonmaleficence, 1 1 which, for our present purposes, we may con-
strue in terms of the requirement not intentionally, knowingly, or
negligently to inflict harms on other persons except in cases of nec-
essary and proportional self-defense"3 2 or in certain extreme cases
of just necessity1 33 or extreme duress.13 4 Since our present concern
is with the broad implications of this principle for the right to life,
which it in part defines, let us focus here on the moral basis of the
prohibition of harm.
Let us begin with the very idea of personhood, or rational auton-
omy, in terms of which treatment as equals, from the human rights
perspective, is defined." 5 As we have seen, personhood is defined
in terms of certain higher-order capacities, developed or undevel-
oped, which enable persons critically to reflect on and revise the
form of their lives in terms of arguments and evidence to which
they freely and rationally assent. The exercise of these capacities is
shown when people adopt, examine self-critically, and revise plans
of living in terms of various forms of evaluative criteria-
sometimes principles of rational choice whereby they define and
pursue their system of ends in a way better designed to satisfy all
or a greater number of them now or in a more harmonious and
complementary way over their life cycle,1'3 sometimes personal
131. For a general discussion of this principle, see D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION,
supra note 19, at 176-85. See also T. BEAucHAm & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETmICS 97-134 (1979).
132. On self-defense, see D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 181; Rich-
ards, Human Rights, supra note 23, at 1435-36. See also C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 42-53
(1978).
133. See Richards, Human Rights, supra note 23, at 1437-39.
134. See id. at 1431-32.
135. C. FRIED, supra note 132, at 7-53.
136. For an account of rational choice and its principles in such contexts, see D. RICH-
ARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 27-48.
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ideals of excellence in which they invest their rational self-es-
teem,137 sometimes in terms of ethical principles either of minimal
decency1 38 or supererogatory heroism or beneficence. 139 From the
perspective of an autonomy-based ethics, divergent and quite dis-
parate plans of life may be reasonably affirmed and pursued on
such terms;1 0 the notion of rationality, in terms of which persons
often evaluate and revise their lives, yields a neutral theory of the
good which is compatible with enormous diversity and idiosyncrasy
of life design. Consistent with this diversity and idiosyncrasy, how-
ever, there are certain things which not unreasonably we may as-
sume all rational persons want as typical conditions of whatever
else they want. For purposes of his theory of distributive justice,
Rawls calls these "general goods"141 and focuses on wealth, status,
property, etc., as examples. For purposes of our present focus on
the natural duties, we may identify as such goods the typical ra-
tional interest of persons, 42 as conditions of pursuing whatever
else they want, in basic integrity and control of their bodies, per-
sons, and lives and thus in security from forms of interference with
this integrity, including injury, pointless cruelty, and most forms of
killing.143
The principle of nonmaleficence would be agreed to or universal-
ized, consistent with the autonomy-based interpretation of treating
persons as equals, because it secures the fundamental interest of
personal integrity in terms of a prohibition which does not typi-
cally require persons to sacrifice substantial interests. Substantial
interests are not sacrificed because the pursuit of persons' substan-
tial interests does not indispensably require acts forbidden by the
principle 44 or, at least, does not typically do so. Forms of self-
137. See id. at 264-67.
138. See id. at 107-95.
139. See id. at 205-11.
140. See Dworkin, supra note 93, at 113-43.
141. See notes 87-88 & accompanying text supra.
142. I omit here any discussion of the possible interest of persons in constraining forms of
cruelty to animals. For some discussion, see D. PCHARS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note
19, at 182-83.
143. For a similar formulation, see Brandt, A Moral Principle About Killing, in BENI-
cENT EuTHANAs 106-14 (M. Kohl ed. 1975).
144. The requirement that actions required by a principle do not call for substantial sac-
rifices of personal interests-for example, death, ill health, penury-is a central reason why
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defense and the like are expressly exempt from the principle be-
cause they do not clearly observe this or similar conditions.
145
The principle of nonmaleficence, consistent with its moral basis
in protecting personal integrity on fair terms to all persons who
both benefit from the principle and bear the burden of observing
it, is defined in terms of the prohibition of harms, which is in turn
defined in terms of the frustration of the rational interests of per-
sons as conditions of whatever else they want. It is important to
see and give weight to the place that harm, so understood, plays in
properly interpreting its requirements. Not all forms of pain are
forbidden by the principle, for some kinds of pain infliction do not
violate the rational interests of persons and thus are not harms.
Consider, for example, the pain of self-knowledge that good educa-
tion or therapy may indispensably involve. The infliction of such
pain, guided by wise experience, is no harm, indeed it is often
among the most good one person can do for another.
146
Correspondingly, the principle, properly understood, does not
forbid killing as such, but forbids those killings which are harms. 47
Clearly, most killings of persons are harms in the sense to which
we can give a sensible interpretation, 48 namely that persons typi-
cally have a rational interest in living which killing frustrates. Epi-
curus, in a famous conundrum, challenged the intuition that one's
death could be an evil:
So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so
the principle is one which defines duties or obligations which may be coercively enforced;
otherwise, justifiable coercion would never be agreed to. D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION,
supra note 19, at 277.
145. In self-defense contexts, the agent would be harmed unless harm were used in de-
fense. See authorities cited note 132 supra. In cases of just necessity, harm is inflicted only
as a way of fairly avoiding greater harm. See Richards, Human Rights, supra note 23, at
1437-39. In duress, the agent is threatened with harm which a reasonable person cannot
resist. See id. at 1431-32.
146. Even masochistic pleasure in some cases may be regarded as a good not forbidden by
nonmaleficence. See D. RIcHARDs, REASONS FOR AcTION, supra note 19, at 178.
147. Brandt, supra note 143, at 106-14. See also Brandt, The Morality and Rationality of
Suicide, in ETmcAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 123-33 (T. Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds.
1978).
148. Joel Feinberg has noted the oddity of asking whether a murderer has harmed his
victim. See Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest, in LAW, MORALITY AND SocIY 299 (P. Hack-
er & J. Raz eds. 1977). Nonetheless, on reflection, he can give a sense to the idea. Id. at 299-
308.
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long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes,
then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living
or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no
more.
149
Surely this paradox falsely supposes that the evil of death must, to
be sensible, be cotemporal with life as such, which would render
the concept senseless and incoherent,150 but it is a mistake to iden-
tify the evil of death with some absence of good in living.15 1 The
rational self-interest of persons in life is not in just life as such, but
in the kinds of plans and aspirations of the person which life
makes possible. Such plans and aspirations are independent of our
actually living, for their success or failure may be known only long
after our deaths.5 2 And during our lives, such plans and aspira-
tions are our reasons for living; indeed, death is an evil, where it is
an evil, because it cuts off those still vital plans in which we have
centered our selves. 53
It must follow that there are some cases in which killing or end-
ing one's life will not be a harm, namely, where a person has a
rational interest in dying.154 Surely we can give a coherent sense to
this idea not merely in terms of specific examples, such as the ter-
minally ill cancer patient, in terrible pain, demanding death, but in
terms of a general characterization of cases, namely, those in which
the person's plans, assessed and subject to revision in terms of
149. Epicurus, Letter to Monoeceus, in Tnn SToic AND EpicuaRAN PHmosoPHERs 31 (W.
Oates ed. 1940). For the comparable passages in Lucretius, see HI DE RERUM NATURA 11.830-
1091. For commentary, see Silverstein, The Evil of Death, 77 J. Pim. 401-24 (1980).
150. See generally Silverstein, supra note 149.
151. See id. at 405-10.
152. See Feinberg, supra note 148, at 299-308, where the point is made in terms of post-
humous harms to one's interests, for example, the frustration of altruistic aims in which one
centered one's life or defamation to one's reputation. In Nagel, Death, in MORAL PROBLEMS
361-70 (J. Rachels ed. 1971), Nagel notes the existence of harms of which a person is not
and cannot be aware, for example, "the misfortunes of being deceived, despised, or be-
trayed." Id. at 366. Nagel includes in this idea that breaking a deathbed promise is "an
injury to the dead man." Id.
153. See Nagel, supra note 152, at 361-70. See also B. WIuAmsS, The Makropulos Case:
Reflections of the Tedium of Immortality, in PROBLEMS OF TM SUP 82-100 (1973). Wil-
liams' argument rests on the thought that the boredom that immortality would introduce
into our appetite for plans and aspirations would be so extreme that life might become an
eviL
154. See authorities cited note 147 supra. See also D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTON,
supra note 19, at 177-79, 193-95.
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standards and arguments to which he or she gives free and rational
assent, are better satisfied by death than by continued life.155 From
the point of view of the neutral theory of the good, fundamental to
the autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as equals,
these matters must be assessed in terms of the individual person's
coherent system of rational ends, plans, and projects. From this
perspective, there are cases of both altruistic and egoistic motiva-
tion in which certain persons more reasonably secure their rational
ends by death than by continued life. Surely we have no difficulty
in understanding the reasonableness of such actions in cases of
heroism or saintly beneficence, when death is embraced as the nec-
essary means to do great goods for others and death thus realizes a
personal vision of fulfillment whose ideals cannot be met better.
Comparable cases exist in which, for persons with certain coherent
and rationally affirmed plans of life in certain circumstances, death
may be reasonably justified in terms of better realizing the ends of
their life plan. For example, a person for whom the pain of termi-
nal illness has no redemptive meaning, for whom the illness frus-
trates all the projects of life in which the person centers life's
meaning, for whom death is, in any event, highly probable, and for
whom such pointless pain and physical decline affirmatively vio-
lates ideals of personal integrity and control, may find in present
death more rationality and meaning than prolonged life.156 Even
outside such contexts as terminal illness, present death may be a
reasonable course for persons who find in continued life the frus-
tration of all the significant aims and projects in which, as persons
with freedom and full rationality, they define their selves and in
which the choice of death may, as an expression of dignified self-
determination, better realize their ideals of living than a senseless
life of self-contempt. In Ibsen's Ghosts, when Mrs. Alving is asked
by her son Oswald to kill him when his incurable idiocy comes on
him again, Oswald's voluntary choice appears rational in terms of
his preference for death rather than a life spent in dependent idi-
155. See Brandt, The Morality and Rationality of Suicide, supra note 147, at 123-33.
156. D. RicHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTON, supra note 19, at 177-79, 193-95. See also M.
KoHL, THE Monirry oF KUmLING 71-110 (1974); Barrington, Apologia for Suicide, in EUTHA.
NASIm AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH (A. Downing ed. 1969); Flew, The Principle of Euthanasia,
in EuTHAAsL IA IGHT To DEATH 30-48 (A. Downing ed. 1969).
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ocy and childishness. 57 The sense in which Oswald rationally
wishes death must be interpreted in terms of his individual desire
for personal competence and autonomy which is, for him, the sine
qua non of satisfying all other desires he may have. His rational
ends here are better secured by being killed intentionally by an-
other, and thus ending all desire, rather than by continuing life
with the frustration of his basic personal ideals of competence. '
Perhaps, as Seneca argued,'15 9 for some persons such a course
would be similarly reasonable when facing the prospect of
senility.6 0
If death in such cases cannot be regarded as harmful, such forms
of killing cannot be properly regarded as within the scope of the
principle of nonmaleficence. But, consistent with our discussion of
these cases, we must underline the limited nature of the exemption
of these cases from the principle that the infliction of death is not
a case of harm when the individual person voluntarily requests
such death, or can reasonably be shown would request it, and the
request appears rational in terms of the system of rational ends
that the person would, with full freedom and rationality, affirm." 1
Fundamental to the autonomy-based interpretation of treating
persons as equals is the idea that the rational self-determination of
the person is ethically fundamental and cannot be parsed in terms
157. The example is taken from D. RicHARs, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 178-
79.
158. Id.
159. Seneca observes:
I will not relinquish old age if it leaves my better part intact. But if it begins to
shake my mind, if it destroys its faculties one by one, if it leaves me not life
but breath, I will depart from the putrid or tottering edifice. I will not escape
by death from disease so long as it may be healed, and leaves my mind
unimpaired. I will not raise my hand against myself on account of pain, for so
to die is to be conquered. But if I know that I must suffer without hope of
relief, I will depart, not through fear of pain itself, but because it prevents all
for which I would live.
H. FEDDEN, SUICIDE: A SOCIAL AND MIsTomcAL STUDY 178 (1938) (quoting Seneca). The same
passage is excerpted in Gillon, Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Historical Perspective,
in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH 174-75 (A. Downing ed. 1969). For an extended
general treatment by Seneca of suicide, see THE STOIC PHMosoPHY OF SENECA 202-07 (M.
Hadas trans. 1965). See also SENECA LETTERS FROM A STOIC 124-30 (R. Campbell trans.
1969).
160. D. PORTWOOD, COMMON-SENSE Suicm.: THE FINL RIGHT (1978).
161. D. RIcHARDs, REAsONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 178-79.
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of some more basic moral element like pleasure or pain. A main
objection of this perspective to utilitarianism is that utilitarianism,
in its obsessive focus on pleasure as such, dissolves moral personal-
ity into utilitarian aggregates ignoring the ethically crucial fact
that persons experience pleasure and that pleasure has significance
and weight only in the context of the life that a person chooses to
lead.162 Accordingly, the human rights perspective, which focuses
on treating persons as equals, gives no fundamental weight to plea-
sure or pain as such; rather, it secures to persons, on fair terms to
all, respect for higher-order capacities of personal dignity, whereby
persons may define for themselves the weight that pleasure will
play in their design of life. In the context of the present discussion
of nonmaleficence, we see the dramatic implications of this per-
spective in concrete terms: forms of killing are not exempt from
nonmaleficence on any basis of a net of pain over pleasure or evil
over good, however measured, in the life of the person, let alone
the surrounding persons. Many people whose lives contain more
misery and pain than pleasure find in such lives robust and sus-
taining meaning1 63 and find death wholly irrational, certainly not
anything they would voluntarily request. From the perspective of
human rights, killing them is as violative of nonmaleficence as kill-
ing the most flourishing hedonist. Properly exempt from
nonmaleficence are only those cases of killing which express the
underlying values of human rights-voluntary choice and rational
self-definition.16'
It is important to see the significant constraints that this ac-
count imposes on exempt forms of killing: if a person is capable of
voluntary consent, such consent must always be secured; if such
consent is impossible, it must be determined reasonably that it
would be given in such circumstances. Even voluntary consent,
however, does not suffice. In addition, it must be clear that the
162. See notes 75-79 & accompanying text supra.
163. For a starkly dramatic statement of this position, derived from the experience of
Jews in Nazi camps, see V. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING (1959). For a good state-
ment of this point by a philosopher, see Foot, Euthanasia, in ETmcAL IssuES RELATING TO
LImF Ar DEATH 14-40 (J. Ladd ed. 1979).
164. The infliction of pain, as opposed to killing, may be justified in certain cases without
a voluntary consent requirement. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at
180.
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form of death is one which appears rational in terms of the system
of ends that the person would, with full freedom and rationality,
affirm. We shall return to this point when we examine the princi-
ple of paternalism.
Again in contrast to utilitarianism,"15 this account puts sharp
constraints on killing in cases where persons have been capable of
consent, for example, young children and the defective."' 8 We be-
gin with the thought that all creatures are persons who have the
capacities, developed or undeveloped, to be persons with some ca-
pacity for self-critical reflection on their lives. 11 Aside from certain
extreme cases,1 8 most young children and defectives are persons in
this sense: they have these capacities in some form.6 9 It is very
165. For recent forms of utilitarian argument to this effect, see note 43 supra.
166. In this, I disagree with Marvin Kohl, who extends his notion of voluntary euthanasia,
with which the account here given is sympathetic, to encompass the consent of parents on
behalf of infants. See Kohl, Voluntary Beneficent Euthanasia, in BENEFcENT EUTsHANAsi
134 (M. Kohl ed. 1975). Kohl's insensitivity to this problem arises, I believe, from the em-
phasis of his account on the quasi-utilitarian concept of "kindness," rather than the rights
of the person. See generally M. KOHL, THE MoImTY OF KILLING 77-91, 96, 106 (1974). For
a similar query about this move in Kohl's argument, see P. DEVINE, THE ETmCS OF Hoba-
CIDE 174-75 (1978).
167. See D. RIcHARDs, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 81, 182-83. See also E.
KLUGE, THE PRAcIcE OF DFATH 88-95 (1975).
168. An example of such extremes is human creatures born without brains, a condition
characterized medically as anencephaly. See J. WARKANY, CONGENITAL MALFORmATIONS 189-
99 (1971).
169. There are two distinct positions in the recent philosophical literature on what makes
a creature a person and thus gives rise to moral claims of rights. First, there is the position
that personhood rests not on capacities for self-critical rationality, but on actual exercise of
such capacities in forms of actual self-consciousness. This position appears to have been
adopted because it makes sharply clear that unborn fetuses are not persons in any sense,
but it also has the consequence that young infants are not persons either since infants lack
the requisite exercise of higher-order self-consciousness. See Tooley, A Defense of Abortion
and Infanticide, in TnE PROBLEM OF ABORTION 91 (J. Feinberg ed. 1973). Recent utilitarian
theories appear to deploy something like this argument, introducing nonutilitarian consider-
ations of autonomy or personhood as strong, indeed conclusive, reasons against killing when
a person has developed self-consciousness, but, when developed self-consciousness does not
yet exist, supposing the moral issue to depend on utilitarian consequences. With this view,
infanticide of young infants and involuntary euthanasia of defectives may be justified. See
J. GLOVER, supra note 43, at 150-69, 190-202; P. SINGER, supra note 43, at 122-26, 130-39.
Nonutilitarian theorists, who adopt Tooley's conception of the person, concur with the utili-
tarian theorists about the justifiability of involuntary euthanasia of newborn infants. See,
e.g., Engelhardt, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in KILLING AN
LErING Dm 81-91 (B. Steinbock ed. 1980) (even voluntary euthanasia of defective infants
may be morally justified, but, on grounds of prudence, passive euthanasia is to be
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difficult to see how killing them could be justified as an exemption
from nonmaleficence. In the case of those who have been mature
adults, but who are now incapable of consent, for example, the co-
matose, we may reasonably infer the nature of their consent from
those who have known them intimately.17 0 But, in the case of those
who have to date been incapable of consent, it appears difficult to
give a defensible sense to either imputed consent on their behalf or
to the idea that they would rationally consent to die. The point is
not merely the obvious one of just suspicion of the independent
judgment of those who consent on their behalf, who may have
strong interests to free themselves from such dependents; but, at a
deeper level, how can a person who has lived as a mature adult
justly enter into the personal world of a child or defective who has
never been a mature adult? 71 There is no injustice in asking the
intimate of a mature adult now incapable of consent what that
person, if still capable of consent, would wish to be done if he knew
he would be in his present situation; we regard the reasonably as-
certained wishes of a mature adult as authoritative in such cases.
But there is no moral symmetry between this case and that of a
person who has never been capable of rational consent; a person,
while capable of rational consent, certainly has authority to deter-
mine what shall happen to her or him when lacking such capacity,
but there is no comparable moral authority-at least over decisions
to die-of mature adults for those who have never been capable of
preferred).
Second, there is the position, here adopted, that personhood turns not on actual self-
consciousness, but on the capacity, whether developed or undeveloped, for self-conscious-
ness. On this view, personhood turns on the presence in a creature of the capacity, in some
form, for the functions of personhood, even though these capacities are not and cannot be
now fully exercised. For humans, the mark of this, empirically, is the presence of the brain
and higher-brain function in some form. There are two views of when this capacity exists:
(1) that it exists in any organism which will develop this capacity, though it does not now
have it; (2) that it exists only in a creature which has the capacity. For a defense of (1), see
P. DviNE, supra note 166, at 74-105, a view which has the consequence that abortion at
virtually all stages of pregnancy is equivalent to or is the killing of an innocent person. The
view here adopted is (2), which has the consequence that abortion only in the latter stages
of pregnancy raises issues of killing persons. See, e.g., E. KLUGE, supra note 167, at 1-100.
On this view, the thesis of (1) confuses capacities with potentialities. See id. at 15-18, 180.
170. For the contrary view, see Bandman & Bandman, Rights, Justice, and Euthanasia,
in BmNumicmwr EUTHANAsIA 81-99 (M. Kohl 1975).
171. For an eloquent statement of this view, see Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of
Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. Rnv. 213 (1975).
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consent. Surely to permit this inference allows persons to decide
this issue on irrelevant grounds, supposing the choice to be what
they-with the ideals of personal independence of a mature
adult-would want if they knew they would become a child or de-
fective, like Ibsen's Oswald. But, of course, the child or defective
lacks these ideals, and justly may center her or his life in other
sensible ways which the adult cannot conceive. 2 Without reasona-
ble access to the consent of these persons and with little realistic
insight into their systems of ends,73 there is little reason to infer
an exemption from nonmaleficence 7 4
2. The Principle of Mutual Aid
Another set of facts, relevant to the formulation of another prin-
ciple of natural duty which bears on the right to life, relates to
forms of assistance and aid which, at only slight cost to oneself,
one person may render to another in saving the other from grave
172. The supposition appears to be that the child or defective is a former mature adult
now in the child's or defective's body and tortured by the perception of present degradation
of previous talents and competence. But, of course, in this case, unlike the case of Oswald
and the like, there is no such previous person against whom the perception may be ethically
checked.
173. For a moving and illuminating account of the world of a handicapped person from
within, see Metzler, Human and Handicapped, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MaEiciNE 358-63 (S.
Gorovitz et al., eds. 1976). If this account surprises one in ways one could not have antici-
pated, the discontinuities between the worlds of even more handicapped persons and our
own may be, a fortiori, even more severe.
174. For similar skepticism about medical practices of passive euthanasia of defective
newborns, see Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life in ETmcAL
IssuEs m DEATH AND DYING 145-72 (R. Weir ed. 1977). See also McCormick, To Save or Let
Die: The Dilemma of Modem Medicine, in ETmcAL IssuEs IN DEATH AND DYING 173-84 (R.
Weir ed. 1977). Consider, in this connection, that adequate care could alleviate much of the
suffering of spina bifida children. See Zachary, Ethical and Social Aspects of Treatment of
Spina Bifida, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEicnm 342-48 (S. Gorovitz et al., eds. 1976). For
recent philosophical argument in support of the position here taken, see E. KLUGE, supra
note 167, at 131-209. See also P. DzvI, supra note 166, at 167-80. One caveat: one should
distinguish, in the discussion of these matters, the moral issue of involuntary euthanasia or
infanticide, namely that either violates nonmaleficence, from the issue of who bears the just
burden of rearing such children. Certainly, it seems unfair for parents to be regarded as the
just persons to bear such a burden, when they bear no special responsibility for it and did
not fairly anticipate it. Certainly, a just society would give a high priority to relieving par-
ents of this unfair burden, seeking alternative forms of care-including other parental
figures with substantial state input--consistent with the rights of the children.
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forms of harm.17 5 Consistent with the autonomy-based interpreta-
tion of treating persons as equals, persons would agree to or uni-
versalize this principle, enforceable by coercion if necessary, be-
cause in this way, they will guard against the possibility that they
themselves may end up in such a position of requiring assistance
from other persons, where they would wish such assistance to be
given.
It is important to see that the agreement on the principle of mu-
tual aid arises from the consideration of a certain circumscribed
set of circumstances and not all possible circumstances of aid. In
other words, the principle is concerned only with aid, given at
slight personal cost, which secures a great good to the person
aided. The distinction of mutual aid from different sorts of circum-
stances in which persons may do good to other persons must be
contrasted usefully with the traditional and contemporary failure
of philosophers to draw this distinction. Consider Kant's argument
in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals as to why it is a
moral duty to give aid to others in great distress-the argument
involving basically the sort of reasoning just sketched. 76 When
Kant, however, in the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue explicitly
discusses duties of this sort, we learn that they are part of the gen-
eral category of duties of beneficence, which include taking the
morally permissible ends of others as one's own. Thus Kant, on the
one hand, wishes to indicate that they are forms of imperfect duty
which, unlike the imperfect duties of respect, are meritorious, not
owed to other personsY.7 7 In similar fashion, Price discusses the
duty of beneficence, which covers both a person's doing "all the
good he can to his fellow-creatures" generally and doing good to
"distressed persons he ought to relieve."'o7  And Sidgwick clearly
175. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 185-89.
176. Specifically, the argument asserts that a requirement of mutual aid is a minimum
requirement that one would be willing to agree to obey oneself, since it would secure a great
good to oneself, if one were distressed and others obeyed, and that others would also agree
to obey, from an original position of equal liberty. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 51, at
41; see, e.g., I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 34-35 (L. Beck trans. 1956); I. KANT,
METAPHYSICAL PRmNCILES OF VIRTUE 52, 115, 117 (J. Ellington trans. 1964). For comments
on Kant's argument, see Eisenberg, From the Forbidden to the Supererogatory: the Basic
Ethical Categories in Kant's Tugendlehre, 3 Am. PHIL. Q. 255-69 (1966).
177. L KANT, METAPHY SICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE, supra note 176, at 112.
178. R. PmCE, A REVIEw OF THE PmNCIAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 120-21 (D. Raphael ed.
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describes both nonmaleficence and mutual aid as a "somewhat in-
definite limit of Duty" beyond which "extends the Virtue of Be-
nevolence without limit," but he sees these as only relative distinc-
tions within the wider principle of beneficence in reference to
which he grants that the "distinction between Excellence and
Strict Duty does not seem properly admissible in Utilitarian-
ism. 17 9 What is common to these traditional philosophers is the
assimilation of the circumstances of mutual aid to those of general
beneficence and the consequent failure to distinguish and explain
the different sorts of moral principles which are relevant to those
different sorts of circumstances.180
Mutual aid, in contrast to beneficence, requires aid only where
rendering the aid is of little cost to the person who aids: a person
may save another from drowning by merely putting out her hand
or throwing out a lifebelt. This feature explains how the principle
could be agreed to as one of duty, justifying coercion and defining
correlative rights: persons would only agree to or universalize such
a principle, as one of duty, if they knew it did not require a person
to sacrifice life and limb to save another. Of course, acts of hero-
ism, saving persons at such risks, are morally admirable on the
ground of the principle of beneficence.181 But we are here con-
cerned not with the moral ideals of saints and heroes, but with the
human rights that are properly enforceable by law. The principle
of mutual aid defines a natural duty which, properly understood
1948).
179. H. SWGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 253, 492 (7th ed. 1963).
180. This unfortunate confusion continues in philosophical work today. Philippa Foot, for
example, who aptly describes the relevance of different kinds of moral principles to the
justifiability of euthanasia, insists on characterizing what is here called nonmaleficence as a
stringent duty of justice; whereas, mutual aid is said to involve charity. The result is that
the contrast between nonmaleficence and mutual aid, which, properly understood, are two
natural duties, is made into a contrast between duty and supererogation. Foot, supra note
163, at 25-32. Beauchamp and Childress present an even more systematic account of the
range of moral principles relevant to these issues. T. Bz ucHAMP & J. CrMLREss, supra note
131, at 56-96 (autonomy and paternalism); id. at 97-134 (nonmaleficence); id. at 135-167
(beneficence and paternalism); id. at 168-200 (justice). Yet again, Beauchamp and Childress,
by describing mutual aid as the principle of beneficence, obscure the fundamental moral
distinction between mutual aid as a natural duty and beneficence as a principle of
supererogation.
181. See D. IacHARs, REASONS roR ACTION, supra note 19, at 205-11.
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and limited, imposes such enforceable rights."8 2
For purposes of our present analysis, we should note that the
operative concept in the principle of mutual aid, as in that of
nonmaleficence, is harm-here, relieving likely harms. Again con-
sistent with the underlying values of equal concern and respect for
autonomy, harm must be interpreted in terms of the rational inter-
ests of the person. Thus, in line with our previous discussion of
death as harm, in the absence of reason to believe that a person
both wants death and such death is reasonable in terms of a ra-
tional life plan, the opportunity to save from death would be gov-
erned by the principle of mutual aid.
In order to assess the concrete implications of this principle,
consider that mutual aid appears to be a fundamental ethical prin-
ciple underlying medical care.183 Medical professionals, by training
and self-conception, are in a position to render forms of life-saving
aid. In addition, because they are well paid and define their lives in
terms of rendering such aid, often it will be of little cost for them
to render aid. Indeed, there may be some gain. In consequence, the
requirements of mutual aid apply to such professionals more ex-
tensively than they do to ordinary people.'" If this is so, it appears
that different moral principles relevant to the right to life have dif-
ferent scopes of application. Whereas the principle of
nonmaleficence appears broadly to apply to all persons equally, the
principle of mutual aid appears to have more extensive applica-
tions to some persons than to others.8 5 Most cases of mutual aid
involve saving from harms which no one, including the person
aided, would dispute were harms calling for relief; but some cases
are disputed.
182. See Richards, Human Rights, supra note 23, at 1429-30, and D. RICHARDS, THE
MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW, supra note 18, at 209-16, for moral criticism of the failure of
Anglo-American law to recognize such enforceable legal duties commensurate with mutual
aid.
183. Foot, supra note 163, at 25-32; See also T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CILDRESS, supra note
131, at 135-67.
184. See Foot, supra note 163, at 25-34.
185. See id. See also T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CmLDRESS, supra note 131, at 96-134
(nonmaleficence); id. at 135-67 (beneficence).
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3. The Principle of Just Paternalism
Let us begin with a consideration of the proper scope of pater-
nalistic considerations in general and then turn to the special
problems raised by the application of these considerations to
choices like the decision to die. The autonomy-based interpreta-
tion of treating persons as equals would clearly justify a natural
duty defined by the principle of paternalism and explain its proper
scope and limits.21 6 From the point of view of agreement to or
universalization of basic principles of natural duty consistent with
this perspective, persons would be concerned with the fact that
human beings are subject to certain kinds of irrationalities with
severe consequences, including irreparable harms. They accord-
ingly would agree to an insurance principle requiring interference,
if at little cost to the agent, to preserve persons from certain seri-
ous irrationalities in the event they might occur to them.8 7 There
are two critical constraints on the scope of such a principle.
First, the relevant idea of irrationality itself cannot violate basic
constraints of the autonomy-based interpretations of treating per-
sons as equals: the neutral theory of the good, expressed by Rawls
as ignorance of specific identity, and reliance only on facts capable
of empirical validation. In particular, possibly idiosyncratic per-
sonal values cannot be smuggled into the content of "irrationality"
that defines the scope of the principle; rather, the notion of irra-
tionality must be defined in terms of a neutral theory that can ac-
commodate the many visions of the good life compatible with
moral constraints. For this purpose, the idea of rationality must be
defined relative to the person's system of ends which, in turn, are
determined by the person's appetites, desires, capacities, and aspi-
rations. Principles of rational choice require the most coherent and
satisfying plan for accommodating the person's projects over
time.188 Accordingly, only those acts are irrational that frustrate
the person's own system of ends. Paternalistic considerations only
come into play when irrationalities of this kind exist; for example,
186. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 131, at 153-64; D. RICHARDS, REASONS
FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 192-95; Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107-
26 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971).
187. See authorities cited note 186 supra.
188. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 27-48.
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the agent's jumping out the window will cause his death, which the
agent does not want but which he falsely believes will not occur.
Second, within the class of irrationalities so defined, paternalis-
tic considerations would properly come into play only when the ir-
rationality was severe and systematic, that is, due to undeveloped
or impaired capacities or lack of opportunity to exercise such ca-
pacities, and a serious, permanent impairment of interests was in
prospect. Interference in irrationalities outside the scope of this
second constraint would be forbidden in large part because al-
lowing people to make and learn from their own mistakes is a cru-
cial part of the development of mature autonomy.189
When we consider the application of these paternalistic consid-
erations to decisions to die, we immediately see that the second
constraint is satisfied: death is, typically, an irreparable harm, in-
deed the most irreparable of harms. Accordingly decisions to die
are a natural object of paternalistic concern. Indeed, in the absence
of any specific knowledge of the situation or life history of a person
about to inflict death on himself, the general presumption that
death is a harm would appear to warrant paternalistic interference.
In such contexts, at most, one's possibly mistaken interference may
only lead to postponement, which is certainly hardly as bad a re-
sult as not interfering and discovering that the death in question
was clearly irrational.190
On the other hand, as we earlier observed, there are surely some
deaths which are not harms which are both voluntarily embraced
and consonant with a rational plan of life which is, with freedom
and rationality, affirmed.191 In such cases, the first constraint of
just paternalism is not satisfied, and assuming a potential inter-
ferer has knowledge that a person's prospective death is of such a
kind, one would lack any moral title to interfere.
If medical care often is governed by mutual aid, in some cases
paternalism as well comes into play. Consider a case where the
medical professional's conception of the good of the patient is in-
consistent with the patient's conception so that we do not have a
clear case of proper mutual aid. In such controversies, arguments
189. Id. at 193.
190. J. GLOVER, supra note 43, at 176-79.
191. See notes 154-174 & accompanying text supra.
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of paternalism naturally come into play: may the professional in-
terfere for the patient's own good?1 2 Surely the conditions of just
paternalism are, at least arguably, present: the interference is often
at little cost to the professional, and the patient appears irration-
ally to decline medical services which may alone save his life. If the
state of the law is that patients in all such cases have an absolute
right to decline medical treatment, 9 the law cannot be justified by
the principles here articulated, for such rejection may be clearly
irrational in terms of the patient's own rational life plan and thus
the proper object of paternalistic interference.""
On the other hand, it would be grotesquely wrong for the state
to compel any person, other things being equal, to have medical
treatment, even if necessary to save life, when the person conscien-
tiously rejects such treatment as inconsistent with a life plan which
he rationally and freely affirms. To defend such interference on the
ground of the universal value of life is the essence of unjust pater-
nalism, smuggling into the content of irrationality, which defines
the scope of just paternalism, majoritarian ideologies which are no
more neutral than the religious ideologies they despise-for exam-
ple, that of a Jehovah's Witness.9 5 Complications are introduced
when dependent children and the like are introduced into the pic-
ture, either in the form of dependents of the person who prefers
192. See T. BEAucHAMP & J. CHILDRESs, supra note 131, at 82-94, 153-64.
193. For a sense of the complexity of the case law, see Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving
Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FoRDnAM L. REV. 1 (1975). For a broad defense of
such a right, see R. VEATcH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 116-63 (1976);
Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Declihe Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity
Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RuT. L. REv. 228 (1973). For criticism of such a right,
see Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
860 (1965).
194. It may be, however, the intention of defenders of such a right that the idea of "in-
formed consent," on which it turns, requires the kind of rational deliberation and capacity
which would exempt the case from just paternalism. See Cantor, supra note 193, at 236-54.
195. For a case that may be attacked on such grounds, though the issue of competency is
notin fact clear, see John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1970) (blood transfusion ordered for severely injured 22-year old, unmarried woman who
had been a Jehovah's Witness for some time even though her mother refused to authorize
the transfusion). Other courts have upheld the right to refuse a transfusion on religious free
exercise grounds. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 IMI. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (adult Jeho-
vah's Witness, with spouse and adult children who did not oppose her express refusal); Er-
ickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (on general grounds of
self-determination).
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death11 6 or as the person who allegedly prefers death.197 These are
cases in which other factors are relevant. Absent such factors, how-
ever, paternalism is clearly unjust.
4. The Structure of the Right to Life
The interlocking requirements of these three principles of natu-
ral duty-nonmaleficence, mutual aid, and paternalism-establish
the moral structure of the right to life. On this account, that right
is to be understood in terms of the choices protected by the re-
quirements (justifying coercion) of these principles: namely, that
harm not be inflicted (nonmaleficence), that persons be saved from
harms if at little cost (mutual aid), and that persons be saved from
the irreparable harms likely to be worked on themselves by their
own irrational folly (paternalism). The moral complexity of this
right is seen in the fact that its constitutive principles seem to
have different scopes of application; 98 nonmaleficence applies to
everyone, whereas mutual aid and paternalism 9 9 may have special
application to service professionals. This difference may have im-
portant consequences in later defining the morality of various
kinds of decisions leading to death. In general, it cannot be sup-
posed plausibly that these principles forbid the infliction of death
in all circumstances. What then are the arguments supposed to
justify such an absolute prohibition?
B. Moral Arguments for the Prohibition of All Acts Inflicting
Death
The criminal law in the United States appears to express the
moral judgment that, with certain narrow exceptions-the de-
fenses-all forms of killing are wrong. While suicide itself is no
196. See, e.g., Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (mother of seven-month old child), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
197. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (parental religious objection to
blood transfusion for baby with congenital malformation overruled), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
890 (1962). For a general discussion of the complexities of the case law, see R. VEATCH,
supra note 193, at 124-36.
198. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
199. Paternalism and mutual aid have special application to service professionals for the
same reasons, special training and aspirations.
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longer criminal in many states,200 aiding and abetting suicide is, in
general, criminal.2 01 In the United States forms of euthanasia,
which in European countries are often grounds for mitigation and
even exculpation,20 2 are officially regarded as equally criminal as
pure murder.203 The underlying moral condemnation of all acts in-
flicting death appears to rest on a number of disparate grounds
including: (1) life as God's property, (2) life as the property of the
state, (3) the immorality of despair, (4) life as the inalienable basis
of moral personality, (5) harms to determinate third parties, (6)
paternalistic arguments about the irrationality of all decisions to
die, and (7) wedge arguments.
1. Life as God's Property
The most ancient philosophical argument for the immorality of
self-willed death, which echoes through the history of all later re-
flection in Western thought on this question, is Socrates' brief ar-
gument in Plato's Phaedo to the effect that release from life must
take place only at God's will, for "the gods are our keepers, and we
men are one of their possessions. 2 04 Plato appears to use this ar-
gument metaphorically as a way of expressing moral conclusions
arrived at on other grounds. Clearly, in the Phaedo, Socrates'
death, which is regarded as self-willed, is supposeed to be one in
which "God sends some compulsion, '20 5 in the sense that death
200. W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 568-70 (1972).
201. Id. at 570-71.
202. See generally Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U.
PA. L. REV. 350 (1954). In Switzerland, for example, physician assistance in a patient's sui-
cide, for reasons of mercy, is not punishable at all. Id. at 376-77. In Uruguay, homicide
motivated by compassion and performed at request is totally exculpated. Id. at 368-69. In
Germany and Switzerland, euthanasia for mercy mitigates. Id. at 360-68.
203. In the criminal law, the maxim that consent is no defense justifies this stance. See
W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, JR., supra note 200, at 408-13. However, the actual history of litiga-
tion relating to cases of euthanasia reveals strikingly erratic patterns of either no prosecu-
tion, acquittals, convictions for lesser crimes, and the like. See, e.g., Sanders, Euthanasia:
None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. CaM. L.C. & P.S. 351 (1969); Survey: Euthanasia: Crimi-
nal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1201, 1213-
15 (1973); Comment, The Right to Die, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 613 (1974); 34 NOTRE DAME LAW.
460 (1959).
204. PLATO, Phaedo 62b, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 45 (E. Hamilton & H.
Cairns eds. 1961).
205. Id. at 45.
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here is "my country's orders";2"' and elsewhere, Plato extends this
category to include forms of stress, calamity, and disgrace which
compel self-willed death.07 To this extent, Plato's metaphor of di-
vine compulsion is not inconsistent with, and indeed may be a way
of giving expression to, the idea of appropriate death in extreme
circumstances of disease or degradation; certainly, the Roman Sto-
ics and other ancients- interpreted Plato in this sense.208
The idea of life as God's property, originating as a metaphor in
Plato, is rigidified into an absolute prohibition on all forms of self-
willed death only by St. Augustine,0 9 whose complex argument St.
Thomas rather summarily adopts;210 thus summary prohibition, in
turn, appears to be the basis, clearly present in Blackstone,211 of
the English heritage of grisly punishment of self-willed death, in
particular, for suicide.21 2 Augustine's argument is complex with
206. Id. at 44.
207. In Laws, Plato discusses the punishment for "self-slaughter though no sentence of
the state has required this of him, no stress of cruel and inevitable calamity driven him to
the act, and he has been involved in no desperate and intolerable disgrace, the man who
thus gives unrighteous sentence against himself from mere poltroonery and unmanly cow-
ardice." PLATO, Book IX Laws, 873c-d, at 1432, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (E.
Hamilton & H. Cairns eds. 1961).
208. The most notable example of this in the ancient world was the widely admired sui-
cide of Cato, which took place after reading the Phaedo. See H. FEDDEN, supra note 159, at
95-101. For a general description of attitudes to suicide in the ancient Greek and Roman
world, see id. at 49-106. See also, J. CHORON, SUICIDE 15-24 (1972). For examples of the
sentiments of Roman Stoics, see the Seneca excerpts in note 159 supra. On the pervasive
influence of the Socratic model, see J. RIsT, SToIc PHILOSOPHY 233-55 (1969).
209. See AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY OF GOD-AGAINST THE PAGANS 26-39 (1972).
210. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part. II-Il, q. 64, art. 5.
211. Blackstone's justification for the grisly penalties for suicide is clearly theological and
statist. "[T]he suicide is guilty of a double offence; one spiritual, in invading the prerogative
of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal,
against the king, who hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects." 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, CommENTAREs *189. The strong theological base for the English prohibition was ex-
pressly acknowledged by English judges. Suicide was criminal as
an offence against nature, against God, and against the King. Against nature,
because it is contrary to the rules of self-preservation ... to destroy one's self
is contrary to nature, and a thing most horrible. Against God, in that it is a
breach of His commandment, thou shalt not kill .... Against the King in
that hereby he ... has lost one of his mystical members.
Hales v. Petit, 1 Plowden 253, 262, 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (1562).
212. This heritage included dishonoring the corpse of the suicide-inherited from Chris-
tian practices-and forfeiture of estate of the suicide. See G. WILLIAMs, supra note 38, at
257-64.
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many strands, some of which we shall later examine; its conclusion
is an absolute prohibition, except in those mysterious cases-here,
a faint echo of Plato21s--where "the Spirit . .. secretly ordered"
self-willed death. 14 For present purposes, we may focus on Augus-
tine's argument that in all cases our life is the property of God that
we may not surrender.
The heart of Augustine's argument appears to be a theological
interpretation, in fact highly controversial, 15 of "You shall not
kill" in the Decalogue. 21e On the basis of this interpretation, Au-
gustine seems prepared to question even the justifiability of self-
defense, 217 let alone forms of self-willed death. Such a theological
argument may compel the assent of those who share Augustine's
perceptions and interpretations; certainly, they have the right to
govern their lives in accord with its mandates. But, of course, it is
not a moral argument of the form that may be an acceptable basis
for the public morality of persons of differing religious and philo-
sophical perceptions, for-on the model of constitutional morality
here deployed-a theological argument of this form would be given
no decisive weight in determining public morality by persons lack-
ing knowledge of specific identity whose agreements depend on
facts capable of interpersonal validation.218 Indeed, from the per-
spective of the autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons
as equals, the idea that our lives are the property of anyone but
ourselves appears to compromise the basic dignity of moral
213. See note 205 & accompanying text supra.
214. AUGUSTINE, supra note 209, at 32. Augustine uses this explanation to account for
Samson's suicide. Id. at 37.
215. There is little evidence that the Old Testament was concerned with suicide as such;
the suicides mentioned there go without comment. Even the New Testament nowhere con-
demns suicide; the Church only develops concern with it in the third century. See J.
CHORON, supra note 208, at 13-15, 24; H. FEDDEN, supra note 159, at 30-31. One scholar has
observed linguistic evidence of Old Testament unconcern with suicide as such. Daube, The
Linguistics of Suicide, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 387, 394-99 (1972). Daube also notes the lack of
any authoritative evidence in Jewish doctrine of the appropriate period for the Augustinian
subsumption of suicide under the Sixth Commandment's prohibition of "murder," the He-
brew word never being used for self-willed death. Id. at 414-15 n. 166. For an argument by a
Christian theologian that the Augustinian interpretation is clearly wrong, see J. FLETCHER,
supra note 41, at 195-96. For current Jewish views, see Sherwin, Jewish Views of Euthana-
sia in BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA 3-11 (M. Kohl ed. 1975).
216. AUGUSTINE, supra note 209, at 31-32.
217. Id. at 36.
218. See notes 90-94 & accompanying text supra.
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personality.
Perhaps Augustine's argument may be given an appealing moral
interpretation as a way of saying that the basic equality of all per-
sons means that no person may judge the worth of other persons
and that forms of killing, if permitted at all, would compromise
this basic value.219 Certainly, this kind of argument has appeal
when directed against certain kinds of utilitarian defenses of kill-
ing which suppose that the net of pain over pleasure talismanically
identifies those who may live and those, including young infants
and the defective, who must die.220 But then, it is a general objec-
tion to utilitarianism that it fails to take seriously treating persons
as equals. Defects in its account of permissible killing evince this
larger mistake. It is not true, however, as this interpretation of Au-
gustine supposes, that all justifications of killing must commit this
error, for there is one person who may, within limits, justly assess
the rational meaning of life or death to a person, namely, the per-
son herself or himself. Indeed, to deprive the person of this right,
in the cases to which it properly applies, is to deprive the person of
the dignity of constituting the meaning of one's life.
2. Life as the Property of the State
That self-willed death immorally violates our duties to the state
is a prominent feature of Aristotle's condemnation, 221 which St.
Thomas repeats with approval,222 and Blackstone reads into the
Anglo-American legal heritage.223 Aristotle's argument is certainly
consistent with his general perfectionist ethics of heroic and crea-
tive display and performance: the highest exemplars of ethical con-
duct are persons of heroic capacity and intellectual and creative
talent who devote their lives to public service through the achieve-
219. See e.g., Sullivan, The Immorality of Euthanasia in BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA, 12-33
(M. Kohl ed. 1975). Specifically, Sullivan argues that man does not have full dominion over
his life, that he has even less dominion over the lives of others, and that God has dominion
over the lives of all. Id. at 14. This is the typical Christian argument that man has no abso-
lute control over his life: he has the use of it but may not destroy it. See N. ST. JOHN-
STEvAs, LAW AND MoRALs 51 (1964). See also P. DPviNE, supra note 166, 167-80.
220. See notes 165-174 & accompanying text supra.
221. AmsToTLE, NIcomAc AN ETHIcs 1138a4-1138b14, at 143-44 (1962).
222. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part. HI-H, q. 64, art. 5.
223. See note 211 supra.
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ment of works of excellence, whether in war, politics, the arts, or
the life of theory.22 Since the self-willed death of such a person,
except in some heroic exploit, deprives society of a perfectionist
asset, it is paradigmatically immoral or, as Aristotle prefers to put
it, unjust. 225
Aristotle's ethics, like Plato's, is remote from the autonomy-
based interpretation of treating persons as equals which introduces
concepts of human and natural rights unknown in the thought of
ancient Greece.226 Certainly the Aristotelian assumption that one's
life is a collective asset which the state may exploit on whatever
terms redound to its perfectionist glory is at war with the con-
tractarian metaphors of human rights, which require, as conditions
of just obedience, reciprocal respect of individual well-being and
dignity. From this perspective, the absolute prohibition on self-
willed death in circumstances reasonably perceived by the person
as perpetuating pointless and degraded life must appear to be, as
Montesquieu put it, "the unjust sharing of their utility and my
despair. "227
The state certainly has a just interest, defined in terms of back-
ground principles of justice incumbent on it, not only to protect
the right to life of its citizens and persons subject to its protection,
but to guarantee fair conditions of life that enable persons to live
well with self-respect.2 28 When the state reasonably meets its du-
ties of justice in such respects, persons who benefit therefrom may
224. The whole of AiSTOTLE, NicomACHn ETmIcs (1962), is an attempt to describe the
human excellence which morality requires us to maximize. See Book 10 for a characteriza-
tion of the special weight Artistotle gave to the human excellence of theoretical wisdom.
225. See ARisToTLE, supra note 221.
226. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 12, at 964-70.
227. C. MoNmsQumu, THE PERSIN LnrrasR 157 (1961). David Hume similarly remarks:
All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something reciprocal. I
receive the benefits of society, and therefore ought to promote its interests; but
when I withdraw myself altogether from society, can I be bound any longer?
But allowing that our obligations to do good were perpetual, they have cer-
tainly some bounds: I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the ex-
pense of a great harm to myself: why then should I prolong a miserable exis-
tence, because of some frivolous advantage which the public may perhaps
receive from me?
D. HumE, On Suicide, in EssAYs MoRAL PoLmrcAz AND LrrERARY 593-94 (1963) (1st ed. Ed-
inburgh 1741).
228. See D. RIcHARDs, REAsONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 107-47; J. RAwLS, supra
note 19.
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be under moral obligations of fairness and natural duties of justice
to obey the law.229 Sometimes, for example, in a just war regulated
by principles of proportionality and effectiveness,2 30 citizens may
even be under moral duties to risk their lives in defense of the just
institutions from which they have benefited; sometimes, where
such obligations have been fairly and freely undertaken and have
yielded the person countervailing and reciprocal benefits in the
past, persons may have obligations to put aside private despair in
order to afford some great social good to society that cannot other-
wise be supplied.2 s3 But such reciprocities of benefit and obligation
apply only in certain circumstances and to limited extents; they do
not yield any general duty of the kind that Aristotle and his tradi-
tion suppose. Indeed, such a general duty appears clearly unjust: it
ignores the basic contractarian implications of human rights, giv-
ing no weight to the intrinsic limits on state power that the rights
of the person require. The state may not require anything and eve-
rything of persons, as Aristotle's idea of life as the property of the
state mistakenly supposes. If the autonomy-based interpretation of
treating persons as equals means anything, it means that the whole
idea of property rights in our lives-whether title lies in God, other
persons, or the state-is radically misplaced, denying, as it does,
the basic dignity of the person in shaping a life, as a free and ra-
tional agent, and demanding, as a condition of any just demand on
one for contribution or obedience, respect for this dignity. Aris-
totle's idea of unconditional demand indulges the kind of fantasy
of total control and subordination which the ideal of a free person,
expressed in the human rights perspective, repudiates and should
repudiate. It is a kind of demand which a just state or a just God2 2
would not make, at least in the form of an enforceable legal duty.
3. The Immorality of Despair
Both Plato233 and Aristotle23 evince concern with forms of self-
229. D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 148-75.
230. See note 130 & accompanying text supra.
231. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 150-51.
232. See Brandt, The Morality and Rationality of Suicide, supra note 147, at 123-33.
233. See note 207 supra.
234. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 221. See also id. 1116a10-1116a15, at 71-72.
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willed death which involve moral defects of character, in particu-
lar, in the courage that a person of reasonable firmness would dis-
play in the face of certain kinds of fear and disappointment and
consequent temptations to end it all. Neither philosopher appears
to be thinking of all forms of self-willed death; Aristotle appears
clearly to regard certain forms of altruistic self-willed death as
both moral and admirable,23 5 and Plato regards self-willed death as
justified in certain extreme circumstances.213 In Augustine,2 7 fol-
lowed by St. Thomas, 8 this form of argument has evolved into a
general moral objection to all forms of self-willed killing, including
even acts of heroism or martyrdom-except for the mysterious
cases which "the Spirit . . . secretly ordered" 239-on the ground
that they involve the immorality of despair. The immorality of
such deaths for Augustine is illustrated by Judas' suicide, for "he
despaired of God's mercy and in a fit of self-destructive remorse
left himself no chance of a saving repentance. 240
One specific application of Augustine's argument suggests what
may have been the primary intention of his thesis. In discussing
hard cases where reasonable people may suppose self-willed death
to be justified, Augustine clearly considers the hardest case to be
where a Christian in order to protect herself from violent sexual
violation might kill herself rather than submit.2 1 Augustine, often
suggestively Freudian, argues that this moral calculation is defec-
tive, resting on the indefensible-we would say sexist-assumption
that the woman attacked bears some moral responsibility or taint
for having been raped.242 But this assumption, Augustine insists, is
deeply wrong; the woman has done no wrong, but would do wrong
in acquiescing in the false and sexist condemnation by killing her-
self.24 ' In an era of rampant Christian martyrdom,244 Augustine ap-
235. See id. 1115a23-1115b6, at 69-70.
236. See note 207 supra.
237. See AUGUSTME, supra note 209, at 26-39.
238. See T. AQUINAS, supra note 210.
239. AUGUSTNE, supra note 209, at 32.
240. Id. at 27.
241. Id. at 26-31, 36, 38-40.
242. Id. at 26-28.
243. Id. at 26-31.
244. For historical background of the rampant martyrdom, notably the Donatists, against
which Augustine was writing, see H. FEDDFN, supra note 159, at 118-33.
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pears concerned to expose the irrationalities and sometimes im-
moral assumptions which underlie certain forms of self-willed
death. The point of the argument appears to be to purify Christian
ideals of self-sacrifice from a false romanticism of martyrdom.
This form of Augustine's argument is interesting, forceful, and
valid: the romantic idealization2 45 of self-willed death, which in
fact is irrationally inconsistent with the very ideals which the per-
son claims to express in this death, should be exposed for the false
and pathetic thing it is. But Augustine's total prohibition goes well
beyond these cases; clearly, he appeals here to the independent
theological argument earlier sketched:246 it is because our lives are
God's property that we may not will our deaths and that the de-
spair that motivates such will is wrong.
But how, from the perspective of the autonomy-based interpre-
tation of treating persons as equals, can all cases of self-willed
death be regarded as despairing, and why-in those cases that are
despairing-is such despair always ruled out? Certainly altruistic
forms of self-willed death not only may be free from despair, but
affirmative of our most admirable values and aspirations;247 and
even egoistic forms of such death, if undertaken with certain styles
and within certain constraints, may be in some circumstances more
expressive of ideals of dignified invention and unrepining self-mas-
tery than would be continued life.24 In any event, there is no rea-
son to believe that the neutral theory of the good, fundamental to
ideas of human rights, rules out despair as one possibly appropri-
ate response of persons to certain prospects of pain and degrada-
tion. Augustine invokes, in this connection, a certain ideal, highly
controversial and disputable, of the redemptive value of suffer-
ing;249 he assumes, "under the kind of eternity" sub specie
aeternitatis, that any suffering or degradation now, like the suffer-
245. On suicide as an expression of romantic idealization in literature, see A. ALvARxz,
THE SAVAGE GOD 139-213 (1972).
246. See notes 209-220 & accompanying text supra.
247. See ARISTOTLE, NIcOr cHEAN ETHICS 1115a3-1115b6, at 69-70.
248. This is a prominent feature of Stoic reflection on suicide. See note 159 supra. See
generally J. RisT, STOIC PHILOSOPHY 233-55 (1969).
249. This endurance of suffering is, for Augustine, a mark of true greatness of soul. See
AUGUSTINE, supra note 209, at 32-34. For frank acknowledgement that suffering "for the
Christian is not an absolute evil but has redeeming features," see N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra
note 219, at 51.
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ing of Jesus, will be redeemed, indeed that our patient endurance
of such suffering may be the test of our Christian mettle. Nonethe-
less, there is no reason to believe that this ideal is any more enti-
tled to moral enforcement as the only legitimate attitude to suffer-
ing than any other conception. To say that Christian patience is
the only attitude to suffering consistent with rational personhood
is dogmatic.5 0 Many other courses may reasonably accommodate
the diverse individuality of human competences, aspirations, and
ends. What for one is a reasonable, self-imposed ideal of the sanc-
tity of holy and redemptive suffering is, 251 for another, pointless
degradation, a waste of dignity in obsequious decline.5 2
The Augustinian picture here is like the utilitarian's idea of the
simple meanings of pleasure and pain, by which we may analyze all
hard and controversial questions; only here, the elements are not
pleasure and pain as such, but a particular form of pain, despair,
that we are told can have only one tolerable moral interpretation,
namely, being wrong and forbidden. But just as utilitarians are
wrong about the unambiguous meanings of pleasure and pain, Au-
gustine is wrong about despair. For some persons, with visions of
life that they rationally and freely affirm and revise, certain kinds
of suffering and degradation are the natural objects of despair, and
they have a right to respond to this interpretation, in appropriate
circumstances, by ending their lives. It would be outrageous from
the perspective of the autonomy-based interpretation of treating
persons as equals to stay their hand solely on the basis of an Au-
gustinian interpretation of despair which they do not reasonably
250. The attempt to articulate intuition as an argument inevitably falters and ends up
resting on the question-begging affirmation of the preeminent value of life. See, e.g., P. DE-
vNs, supra note 219, at 201-02. Devine first argues that the Stoic attitude to suicide is
inconsistent because it fails to follow its own principle of altering attitudes to the world
rather than the world itself, that is, learning better to endure suffering, rather than commit-
ing suicide. Id. In fact, the description fails to take seriously the Stoic idea of dignity, trivi-
alizing it into a kind of passive adjustment without inner ideals rationally affirmed. Devine
does not pursue that point and begs the question by merely affirming the value of life.
251. For at least one model of Christian spirituality, St. Ignatius, overcoming suicidal de-
spair on the ground that it was forbidden by God was part of his journey to sanctity. See ST.
IGNATIUS' OWN STORY 17-20 (W. Young trans. 1956). A similar journey is expressed by the
poet Gerard Manley Hopkins in his "(Carrion Comfort)". See POEMS AND PROSE OF GERARD
MANLEY HOPKINS 60-63 (W. Gardner ed. 1953). For Hopkins, the resistance to "Despair" is
expressed in "I can; ... not choose not to be." Id. at 60.
252. See notes 154-174 & accompanying text supra.
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share and which has, in any event, no superior moral claim to en-
forcement by law. Surely, in such matters, the range of reasonable
personal ideals is wide, various, and acutely sensitive to personal
context and individual idiosyncrasy. The law has no proper role in
prejudging the method of choosing in general and the proper atti-
tude to suffering in particular.
4. Life as the Inalienable Basis of Moral Personality
Perhaps the most interesting of the arguments regarding the
wrongness of self-willed death are those which center on moral
personality. St. Thomas puts this argument in terms of the natural
law of self-preservation, which self-willed killing unnaturally vio-
lates.25 Immanuel Kant, the father of modern deontological moral
theory, adapts this argument in the form of the claim that ending
one's life is, in some way, inconsistent with the foundations of
one's moral duty to his own personality, and thus is morally wrong.
Kant thus appears to suppose that to "destroy the subject of mo-
rality in his own person is tantamount to obliterating. . . the very
existence of morality itself"2 " and appears to think of self-mutila-
tion as wrong, that is, as a kind of "partial self-murder," for the
same reason.2 55 Kant's sense of the horror of suicide is striking:
We are ... horrified at the very thought of suicide; by it man
sinks lower than the beasts; we look upon a suicide as carrion
Humanity in one's own person is something inviolable; it is a
holy trust; man is master of all else, but he must not lay hands
upon himself .... Man can only dispose over things; beasts are
things in this sense; but man is not a thing, not a beast. If he
disposes over himself, he treats his value as that of a beast. He
who so behaves, who has no respect for human nature and
makes a thing of himself, becomes for everyone an Object of
freewill.2"'
Initially, it is important to be puzzled by the imputation to per-
sons of the natural end of self preservation, which self-willed kill-
253. See T. AQUINAS, supra note 210.
254. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 83-84 (1964).
255. Id. at 84.
256. I. KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 151 (1963).
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ing unnaturally violates, when it is conceded that the capacity for
self-willed killing appears to be a distinctive mark of persons. Ac-
cordingly, why does Kant regard this as a sign of our sinking lower
than the beasts, when, in fact, it may be a feature of the critical
self-consciousness that sets persons apart from other creatures? 57
Donne surely is correct when he argues against the Thomist argu-
ment that what is fundamental to persons is not the preservation
of life but the pursuit of their rational good, as they define it,
which may or may not mean continued life.258 If anything, a purely
naturalistic description of animals and persons might indicate that
self-preservation is a fair description of the animal world, but not
of the world of persons for whom continued life is only one value
among others and not always the dominant one.259 Kant appears to
concede this description when he grants the morality of forms of
altruistic self-willed death,2 60 but he appears to draw the line at
egoistic self-willed deaths, supposing them inconsistent with the
constraints of morality.
At one point, Kant puts this latter argument in terms of univer-
salization: persons could not consistently universalize a principle of
egoistic self-willed killing, for humankind would come to an end,
which is inconsistent with the aims of self-love.26 1 Kant's argument
257. H. FEDDEN, supra note 159, at 312.
258. J. DONNE, BuTHANATOS 49 (1930). In Donne's view then, the principle of self-preser-
vation ceases to be of force when life either ceases or, in the individual's determination,
appears to cease to be a good. David Hume's argument, in response to the Thomistic natural
law conception, is more speculative in scope, but to similar effect: all nature, Hume argues,
is subject to causal laws according to which God rules, and man's nature is also so governed.
But, since man has reason to achieve his purposes, man uses these laws to achieve his pur-
poses; it is no more contrary to nature for a man to achieve his rational purposes of ending
pain and shame by death than it is for man to alter the natural order in order better to
achieve other rational ends, for example, using medicine to fight disease. See D. HUME,
supra note 227, at 587-93. For the English debates on these matters, see S. SPROrr, THE
ENGLISH DEBATE ON SUICIDE FROM DONNE To Humn (1961).
259. To say that person is by definition a self-maintaining system, as in P. DEvINE, supra
note 219, at 20, either reintroduces the unacceptable Thomistic assumption or uninforma-
tively fails to characterize the nature of the self in which persons have rational interests.
260. See L KANT, supra note 254, at 84-85; L KANT, supra note 256, at 150. Kant refuses
to characterize altruistic self-sacrifice as "suicide" in any sense. Id. On the vagaries of char-
acterizing certain behavior as "suicide," see J. MARGOLIs, NEGATIVrrmS 23-35 (1975). See
also Beauchamp, What Is Suicide?, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 97-102 (T.
Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978).
261. See 1. KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 51, at 39-40.
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is question-begging: it assumes what must be shown, that persons'
rational good always involves continued life. The argument also
grossly travesties the kind of limited exemption from
nonmaleficence, mutual aid, and paternalism that is consistent
with the autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as
equals. Instead of the quite circumscribed exemption which we
have described, Kant supposes a kind of moody and open-ended
weariness with life which, like Shakespeare's Hamlet, any loosen-
ing of the "canon 'galnst self-slaughter '262 would unleash in a rash
of mass suicides. Kant underestimates the degree to which persons'
rational good flourishes only in continued life, making the remark-
able and quite indefensible assumption that only an absolute
moral prohibition on egoistic self-willed death could bind us, in
general, to life-a rather striking failure of imagination which the
pre-Christian era does not support.263 In any event, if life were so
desperate and impoverished as to make this assumption reasona-
ble, why should a Kantian morality of decent respect for dignity
bind us to a life which our conscience finds empty of rational
meaning?
We are now at the heart of Kant's argument: the assumption
that ending one's life on egoistic grounds is to repudiate moral per-
sonality, like the sale of one's body or alienation of body parts.
Kant's argument here, as elsewhere in his discussion of traditional
Augustinian offenses against morality,264 rests on an indefensible
interpretation of the relation of moral personality to the body.2 5
Kant identifies the person with the living body, and then argues
roughly as follows: (1) It is always wrong to alienate moral person-
ality; (2) The living body and the person are the same; (3) Egoistic
self-willed death is a kind of alienation of the living body; (4) It is
always wrong to engage in egoistic self-willed death. The crucial
assumption is the second, on the basis of which Kant associates
self-willed death with the surrender or alienation of moral person-
ality and thus labels it a forbidden alienation of the morally
262. See W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act I, scene ii, II. 131-32.
263. See J. CHORON, supra note 208, at 15-24; H. FEDDEN, supra note 159, at 95-101; J.
RIsT, supra note 208, at 233-55.
264. For a discussion of Kant's sexual views, see Richards, Commercial Sex, supra note
23, at 1255-62.
265. See, e.g., I. KANT, supra note 256, at 148-54.
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inalienable.
Kant's identification of moral personality with the body in this
discussion is inconsistent with what he says elsewhere about auton-
omy as the basis of moral personality. In his central statement of
ethical theory, moral personality is described in terms of autono-
mous independence-the capacity to order and choose one's ends
as a free and rational being.266 By comparison, in his discussion of
self-willed death, this autonomous freedom is absolutely and inex-
plicably walled off from any sovereignty over the living body.
These views are impossible to square. Indeed Kant himself appears
to sense the strain that his absolute condemnation of egoistic sui-
cide works on his deeper ideals. He characterizes proponents of
such a right of self-willed death in ways that betray respect: "[I]f
man is capable of removing himself from the world at his own will,
he need not submit to any one; he can retain his independence and
tell the rudest truths to the cruellest of tyrants. '267 And suddenly,
Kant draws back from such admiration with a non sequitur:
Let us imagine a state in which men held as a general opinion
that they were entitled to commit suicide, and that there was
even merit and honor in so doing. How dreadful everyone would
find them. For he who does not respect his life even in principle
cannot be restrained from the most dreadful vices; he recks
neither king nor torments.2 5
But the defense of such a right, properly interpreted, is not only
not inconsistent with an autonomy-based interpretation of treating
persons as equals; it appears to be justified on such a basis. Clearly
the deeper theory of autonomy, Kant's central contribution to eth-
ical theory,26 9 requires the rejection of the parochial and
unimaginative views of moral personality applied in his discussion
of self-willed death. Autonomy, in the fullest sense,270 rests on per-
sons' self-critical capacities to assess their present wants and lives,
to form and act on wants and projects, and to revise and change
them. Autonomy occurs in a certain body, occasioning a person
266. See I. KANT, supra note 51, at 51-52.
267. I. KANT, supra note 256, at 153.
268. Id.
269. See notes 62-69 & accompanying text supra.
270. See notes 62-69 & accompanying text supra.
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self-critically to take into account that body and its situation in
deciding on the form of her or his life. But the embodiment of
autonomy does not isolate the exercise of autonomy in the way
Kant supposes. Kant means to be making the quite valid point
about autonomy-based ethics that it is immoral to abdicate or
alienate one's autonomy or one's capacity for self-critical choice
about the form of one's life. All forms of slavery thus are forbidden
because they involve such a surrender of basic autonomy and of
the human rights that express and facilitate such autonomy. Kant
fuses this valid moral idea with the quite unrelated idea that self-
willed death is a similar kind of alienation. For an autonomy-based
theory, this fusion is conceptual nonsense, darkly obscuring what
Kant dimly senses but cannot acknowledge: that what is ethically
ultimate is the capacity of persons independently to interpret and
to evaluate the rational meaning of the projects and aims that con-
stitute their lives, and that this dignity, properly understood, may
embrace a decision to die. There is no slavery here, but only the
deeper realization of autonomous independence, which must ex-
tend, if it extends to any profound level at all, to evaluations of the
meaning of the boundaries of one's life with death.
It is not difficult to understand how Kant, so powerful in his
statement of abstract universalistic ethics, could be so time-bound
in his casuistry of decisions to die; he assumes, as the foundation
of his discussion, the Augustinian assumptions regarding death
that he also unquestioningly accepts regarding sex.271 Thus when
Kant argues that we have no right to control our dying, he is not
only making the confused and indefensible argument about alien-
ating moral personality just discussed, but he is echoing, as the
texts make clear,272 Augustine's quasi-theological argument about
our lives as the property of God, which we may not alienate. Kant
accordingly isolates death from autonomy in the way conventional
for his period. There is no reason to continue this mistake today.
Indeed, we may note the ultimate intellectual and moral paradox
271. See Richards, Commercial Sex, supra note 23, at 1255-62.
272. While Kant insists that suicide is immoral on ethical grounds independent of puta-
tive condemnation by God's will, he concludes his discussion of its immorality with the tell-
ing Augustinian remark, echoing Plato: "[A] suicide opposes the purpose of his Creator; he
arrives in the other world as one who has deserted his post; he must be looked upon as a
rebel against God." I. KANT, supra note 256, at 153-54.
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of Kant's argument: that the submerged reason for denying our
right to control decisions about death is to place such authority in
another, God. An argument thus couched in the rhetoric of repudi-
ating moral slavery in fact disfigures and denies our moral freedom
in the name of a hidden master.
5. Harms to Determinate Third Parties
Earlier arguments for the immorality of all self-willed deaths
premised on the idea of our life as property of the state2 "3 sug-
gested that absolute prohibitions resting on this conception could
not be sustained, but that more circumscribed moral arguments
might be available forestalling such deaths in specific circum-
stances of fairly undertaken moral obligations of fairness-for ex-
ample, military service in a just war or completing some project
which affords an indispensable good to society before one takes
one's leave. We regarded such arguments as resting on the back-
ground of institutional principles of justice and fairness which
qualify the scope of application of the principles of natural duty
directly relevant to the moral structure of the right to
life-nonmaleficence, mutual aid, and paternalism. Such moral ob-
ligations to society are the most that can be critically sustained of
the absolute prohibitions resting on the idea of life as the property
of the state. But, of course, they are not absolute, applying only in
limited contexts and circumstances. If, for example, a person has
completed any services or projects which society on grounds of re-
ciprocal fairness may demand of him, there is no just claim that
society may make demanding that she or he remain.2 74
A similar analysis applies to moral obligations to determinate
third parties which a person's decision to die may call into ques-
tion. Decisions to die do not occur in a vacuum: persons who ex-
press such wishes reasonably may be embedded in personal rela-
tionships which may relevantly alter our moral evaluation of the
situation. Certainly the central class of such relevant relationships
are those of parent to still young and vulnerable children.
Parenthood is a role embedded in social institutions of family and
273. See notes 221-232 & accompanying text supra.
274. Compare the remarks of Montesquieu at text accompanying note 227 supra with the
remarks of Hume at note 227 supra.
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education, clearly regulated by principles of justice which assess
rights and duties as well as benefits and burdens in terms of fair-
ness and equity to parents, children, and society in general.27 5
Clearly, voluntarily undertaking parenthood gives rise, inter alia,
to moral obligations of fairness to perform one's just role as the
kind of nurturing and sustaining parent which the well-being of
children requires; in addition, natural duties of parenthood appear,
in such circumstances, convergently to require appropriate forms
of care and commitment.27 6 A prima facie violation of such moral
obligations and duties is abandonment, which may involve two in-
dependent wrongs: first, breaking the bond of psychological
parenthood, in early childhood, which may harm the child develop-
mentally; 77 and second, failing to insure that the child receives al-
ternative care of the ethically required kind-individualized atten-
tion, stable affection, stimulation, and concern.27 8 Now such
wrongs are prima facie; countervailing considerations may out-
weigh such wrongs. For example, military service and the like may
require prolonged parental absence, may even lead to death, but in
some circumstances may be the conduct which may be ethically
justified. Self-willed death of a young parent, however, appears
deeply problematic: in most cases, such abandonment appears
clearly wrong. Perhaps we should distinguish the case of the termi-
nally ill parent from the case of the parent who could continue
living quite ably but who, in terms of her or his good, rationally
and freely affirmed, prefers death-for example, the Jehovah's
Witness who on religious grounds declines medical treatment, but
who could survive quite well with treatment. The prolongation of
275. See Richards, The Individual, the Family and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1980).
276. The moral idea here is that, quite apart from background institutional roles, merely
giving birth to a vulnerable child, other things being equal, gives rise to duties of care and
nurturance. See Locke, The Second Treatise, in J. LoCKE'S Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
323-25 (P. Laslett ed. 1960).
277. See generally J. BowLnY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss, (3 vols.: ATTACHMENT (1971); SEPA-
RATION: ANXm AND ANGER (1975); Loss: SADNESS AND DEPRESSION (1980)); J. BOWLBY,
CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LoVE (1953); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CmLD (1973); M. RuTrER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED
(1972).
278. See authorities cited note 277 supra. See also A. CLARKE-STEWART: CHILD CARE IN
THE FAMILY: A REviEw OF RESEARCH AND SOME PROPOSITIONS FOR POLICY (1977).
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life of the terminally ill parent may do little good for the child and,
indeed, may do ill in some cases; perhaps here the ethical require-
ment would be that the parent must insure that some alternative
parental care will be afforded the child before the parent takes her
or his leave. The parent, who could easily survive, may do wrong,
difficult ever to justify, in abandoning the child in such circum-
stances.279 But perhaps some justification may be present in those
cases where the parent can demonstrate that the child already
identifies with a network of stable and loving persons, that the net-
work will continue after her or his death, and that the care has
been so generalized that the parent's absence will not be felt ap-
preciably by the child.2"'
Clearly such moral obligations to determinate third parties do
not justify any absolute prohibition of self-willed death in all cases.
Not all persons who reasonably contemplate self-willed death are
parents. Even with respect to those who are parents, it would be
unacceptably onerous to generalize the arguments sketched above
to restrict the liberty of parents in all stages of their life cycle.2 81
Children grow up, develop lives and relationships of their own, be-
come autonomous. It is as wrong, as violative of the rights of the
person, to suppose that parents' lives are forever the property of
their children as to suppose that lives are property of God or of the
state. Parents have lives of their own, shaped by aspirations, ends,
and projects of which being a parent is only one part, and not nec-
279. Even if there is no moral justification for such conduct, there may be mitigating
circumstances and even forms of excuse-mental disturbance, for example-which would
qualify and sometimes exculpate from moral blame.
280. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972), in which the decision of a Jehovah's
Witness to refuse blood transfusions on religious grounds was upheld though the man had
two young children. The man's wife had testified about continuing care for the children:
"My husband has a business and it will be turned over to me. And his brothers
work for him, so it will be carried on. That is no problem. In fact, they are
working on it right now. Business goes on.
"As far as money-wise, everybody is all right. We have money saved up. Every-
thing will be all right. If anything ever happens, I have a big enough family and
the family is prepared to care for the children."
Id. at 374 (quoting testimony). The record also indicated a close family relationship ex-
tending beyond the parents. Id. For commentary, see R. VEATCH, supra note 193, at 158-59.
281. For the idea of a parental life cycle, see R. RAPOPORT, R. RAPOPORT & Z. STRn'z,
FATHERs, MoTHmR AN SocImr. TowARDs NEW ALIANCEs (1977). See also R. RAPOPORT &
R. RAPOPORT, LEIsuRE AND THE FAMImy Lima CYCLE (1975).
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essarily the most important part. If, in terms of the meaning of life
which a person reasonably and freely affirms, death is the pre-
ferred and projected course, the existence of adult children cannot
morally qualify their right to act So. 28 2 If a parent faces the realis-
tic prospect of terminal illness and reasonably decides that self-
willed death is the better course, how can the grief of those who do
not share the pain or the vision of degradation stay their hand?
Why, ethically, is the grief over this form of death any worse than
the grief over the possibly prolonged and terrible death that would
otherwise take place? 28 3 The death of parents is, in any circum-
stances, difficult for children who are prone to experience therein
unconscious fears, guilt, and remorse.28 4 If the self-willed death of
parents holds special terrors for their adult children, that may be
because of the long tradition of moralistic condemnation of it
which, since Augustine, has dominated the West. But this tradition
appears to be wrong and indefensible, indeed to violate the rights
of the person. When we disencumber ourselves of these false de-
mons, we may enable parents to explain such choices with lucid
rationality to their children, to dissolve their unjust fears or guilt,
and to explain the meaning of this act as an expression of the per-
son they are.285 Unlike the Stoics and others,28 8 we do not have
282. D. PORTWOOD, supra note 160, at 93-106.
283. Certainly, in the circumstances where death is morally permissible, for example, ter-
minal illness, it is uncertain that one who considered effects of his dying on those he loves
would prefer prolonged death and deterioration over available suicidal alternatives, if one
assumes appropriate explanation. For one form of such explanation, see Johnston, Artist's
Death: A Last Statement In A Thesis on 'Self-Termination,' N.Y. Times, June 17, 1979, at
1, col. 1.
284. For a classic study of the pathology of grieving, see S. FREUD, Mourning and Mel-
ancolia, in 14 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 243-58 (J. Strachey trans. 1957) [hereinafter cited as STANDARD EDITION]. See gener-
ally J. BowLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss, supra note 277. For the larger social implications of
unresolved grief, see A. MITSCHERLICH & M. MITSCHERLICH, THE INABILITY TO MOURN (1975).
285. See note 283 supra.
286. For descriptions of these moving ceremonies of self-willed death, see the description
of the suicide of Cato, H. FEDDEN, supra note 159, at 95-101. For Tacitus' account of Sen-
eca's similar death, see THE SToic PHILOSOPHY OF SENECA, supra note 159, at 243-44. For the
suggestion by Enlightenment thinkers of the need for the revival of such rituals, see T.
MORE, UTOPIA 108-09 (E. Surtz ed. 1964); M. MONTAIGNE, A Custom of the Island of Cea, in
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF MONTAIGNE 251-62 (1948); F. NiETzSCHE, HUMAN ALL-Too-HUMAN
85-86, 88, 286-87 (1964). See also MONTESQUiEU, The Grandeur and Declension of the Ro-
man Empire, in III COMPLETE WORKS 86-87 (London 1777); F. NiTZSCHE, THE TWILIGHT OF
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such rituals of self-willed dying: a way of speaking one's own
death, of sharing the moment with those one loves and respects, of
mutual solace and support, which may better affirm the meaning of
one's life than a more isolated and pain-wracked death.28 But that
lack of ritual is our problem, our impoverishment, our failure of
social imagination;28 it is no justification for our failure to respect
the possible dignity of self-willed death and to establish rituals ad-
equate to our moral needs.
6. Paternalistic Arguments
Even if no other moral argument on behalf of condemnation can
be sustained, it may still be argued that undertaking particular
conduct is sufficiently irrational for an agent so that there is moral
title to interfere on paternalistic grounds. We hive already ex-
amined the proper scope of paternalistic considerations, consistent
with the autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as
equals, and their application to self-willed death.28 Our conclusion
was that self-willed death was a natural object of just paternalistic
concern, death being, typically, irreparable harm, but that such
concern, on balance, was unjustified in cases where the person vol-
untarily and rationally embraced death. There is one case
-children-where these considerations clearly dictate just inter-
vention. On the other hand, these considerations, sometimes mis-
takenly, are supposed to render suspect all forms of self-willed kill-
ing. Let us first examine the issue of children and then turn to the
abuses of paternalism in this area.
THE IDOLS 8S-90 (1964); F. NmrzscHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in THE PORTABLE NIETz-
scHE 183-86 (W. Kaufman trans. 1954); A. SCHOPENHAUHR, ESSAYS AND APHORISmS 77-79
(1970); Voltaire, Of Suicide, in 17 WoRics 165 (4th ed. 1772).
287. Recent social historians have brought home the dramatic point that the impersonal
isolation of contemporary dying in hospitals has occasioned the loss of the comforting ritu-
als of public dying at home which characterized previous eras, where the dying person would
bid farewell to family and friends in a ceremony of mutual comfort. See generally P. ARms,
WESTERN ATrruDES TowARD DEATH: FROM Tno MmDLE AGES TO THE PRESENT (P. Ranum
trans. 1974); E. KuRLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING 1-33 (1969); D. STANDARD, Tan PutrrAN
WAY OF DEATH 188-94 (1977). The humane need for such rituals would apply to both ordi-
nary dying and self-willed death. Of course, it is possible that with more-humane concern
for the dying some would not request death. See id. at 122-38. Others, however, might avail
themselves of such rituals reasonably to will an earlier death.
288. See note 287 supra.
289. See notes 186-197 & accompanying text supra.
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If there is one category of persons whose capacity to undertake
death voluntarily, as part of a life plan freely and rationally de-
fined by them, appears justly suspect, it is young children. The is-
sue arises dramatically when parents, who on religious grounds
would will death for themselves, extend such treatment to their
young children.2 90 While children in such cases typically ratify the
parental view, we justly question the rational independence of
mind underlying the ratification. Since the child's view is not the
expression of the freedom and rationality which exempts from pa-
ternalism and since the conduct does involve irreparable harm to
the child, state interference is justified, on the grounds of just pa-
ternalism, in the cases to which the above considerations apply.
Also justified is state insistence on the medical treatment which, in
the case of a mature adult, it could not, consistently with human
rights, order.291
Sometimes, however, paternalistic considerations are supposed
to justify intervention well beyond this limited case. In this con-
nection we must observe the temptation to employ certain radi-
cally inappropriate forms of paternalistic arguments, and query the
force of this temptation in the condemnation of decisions to die.
When we consider the application of paternalistic considerations
to choices of self-willed death, we face the question how to assess
the rationality of this kind of choice. The idea of rationality em-
ployed here takes as its fundamental datum the agent's ends and
aspirations, which the agent organizes, evaluates, and revises dis-
passionately in terms of standards and arguments to which she or
he assents as a free and rational being. In this context, principles
of rational choice are those standards which call for the assessment
of choices in terms of the degree to which alternative choices bet-
ter satisfy the person's ends and aspirations over time.2912 Since the
agent's ends and aspirations over time are often complex and diffi-
cult to anticipate with exactitude, a number of such choices in a
particular case may be equally rational. Nonetheless, there is a co-
herent sense to the application of rationality criteria to these
choices. Some such choices are clearly irrational if they frustrate
290. See note 197 supra.
291. See the discussion of this problem in Richards, supra note 275, at 50-52.
292. C. FRIED, supra note 88, at 155-82.
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every significant end which the agent has, and available alterna-
tives do not.-93 Such irrational choices, if they also are likely to
lead to irreparable harms, may be the proper object of paternalistic
interference.
One radically inappropriate form of paternalistic interference is
that which is grounded in the substitution of the interferer's own
personal ends for the ends of the agent. This substitution fails to
take seriously the fundamental datum of paternalism, that the
agent's ends are defined in terms of her or his rational and inde-
pendent self-definition and that the agent acts irrationally only
when the action frustrates such ends. This error is a frequent prob-
lem in the paternalistic assessment of basic life choices like inti-
mate relations, occupation and vocation, and the boundaries of life
and death in one's values, for in such cases people find it all too
natural facilely to substitute their own personal solutions for the
kinds of imaginative understanding of the perspectives of others
required properly to examine these matters. The temptation to
such paternalistic distortions is particularly strong in cases in
which conventional moral judgments mistakenly condemn certain
conduct absolutely.29'
The assertion of paternalistic arguments sometimes marks a pe-
riod of transvaluation of values in matters of certain kinds of life
choice. Certain conduct traditionally believed to be morally wrong
no longer justifiably may be regarded so.29 5 In such a context, the
last stand of traditional moralists, after they are compelled to con-
cede the lack of moral foundations for their views, is to retreat to
paternalistic arguments that covertly mask the discredited tradi-
tional morality. Because people attach deep significance to tradi-
tionally sanctioned life choices in the choice of intimate relations,
occupation and vocation, life and death, this position is natural.
For many, such decisions are of metaphysical import and invoke
the person's deepest ideology-the kind of choice associated with
293. In terms of rational choice theory, one plan would dominate another. See D. RICH-
ARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 28, 40-43.
294. For a characterization of the distortions of such judgments in the perception of the
availability of commercial sex services, see Richards, Commercial Sex, supra note 23, at
1264-71.
295. See, e.g., Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 12, at 975-99.
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what we shall later discuss as the "meaning of life."296 Given the
personal significance that they may have found in such traditional
moral judgments, their imaginations systematically fail them when
they seriously try to consider whether it could be a rational life
choice to adopt a traditionally condemned life choice. Neverthe-
less, such views cannot be sustained in terms of acceptably neutral
rationality criteria and indeed can be seen to rest on deep moral
confusions which contradict the ultimate values of human rights.
No good argument can be made that paternalistic considerations
would justify the kind of intervention that is involved in the tradi-
tional condemnation of all decisions to die. In some cases, such
choices seem quite rational, indeed all too rational. For example, a
person has a coherent vision of the good of his life, rationally and
freely affirmed and revised, and faces the prospect of painful death
or deterioration in which all significant projects of his life will be
frustrated, a frustration which for him has no redemptive meaning,
and indeed in which continued life would betray the central ideals
around which he centers his conception of a meaningful life; for
him, self-willed death better meets all his significant ends than the
alternative. Indeed, the alternative-continued life-which frus-
trates all his significant ends in a way death would not, may be, by
comparison, irrational.2" If he voluntarily embraces such death, af-
firming therein the considered and reasonably reflective values of
his integrity as a person, there is no ground of paternalism which
could justly stay him.
Indeed, in such cases, we may suspect the views of the persons
who would make paternalistic claims for intervention. Some of the
arguments for the irrationality of all such decisions may be based
on mistaken distortions of the facts. It is as if the extant moralistic
condemnation of decisions to die inexorably shaped the reading of
the facts so as to confirm that the putatively immoral conduct was
personally irrational as well. Accounts of suicides, for example,
claim that they are mentally disturbed 98 or socially maladap-
tive.299 Psychiatrists sometimes supply a psychiatric makeweight to
296. Elsewhere I have characterized the influence of certain of these judgments in terms
of "metaphysical familism." See Richards, supra note 275, at 37 & n.172.
297. See notes 154-174 & accompanying text supra.
298. See, e.g., K. MhENINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF (1938).
299. The classic statement of this position is E. DURKiIM, SUIcmE: A STUDY IN SOCIaL-
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the moral condemnations by claims that suicides are mentally ill or
at least neurotic.300 None of these claims has been sustained by
careful empirical research observing sound scientific methods.301
Typically, such claims rest on the limited sample of people whom
the researcher mistakenly believes to be typical of the research
population at large. 2
The empirical literature on suicide, for example, makes clear
that the phenomenon is quite complex and divides it into different
kinds of phenomena which should not be confused.303 One class ap-
pears to be that of the suicide attempt, who tend to be young, dis-
proportionately female, not undertaking suicide in a way clearly
calculated to succeed, and ambivalently hoping for help. s3 The
other class, of more typically successful suicides, is older, more
likely to be male, designing suicide in a way reasonably designed to
succeed, often in contexts of realistic deprivation.3 0 5 Nothing is to
be gained in confusing the differing moral realities of these two
kinds of persons. The former are persons who, if not mentally ill in
any clinical sense, are subject to moods of depression which disable
them from assessing alternatives in a reasonably flexible and free
oGY (1951). Durkheim appears to assume the Kantian moral view, see notes 253-272 & ac-
companying text supra, to the effect that suicide, as such, immorally violates the founda-
tions of moral personality. See E. DuuKHE1M, supra, at 333-38. For an alternative attempt
by a sociologist to account for the moral and social complexities of suicide, see J. DOUGLAS,
THE SocjL MEAMNGS OF SUICIDE (1967). See also J. BAEcHLER, SUIc Es (1979).
300. See K. MENNINGER, supra note 298.
301. See, e.g., J. CHORON, supra note 208, at 74-78; E. STENGEL, SUIcIDE AND ATTrEMED
SUICIDE 58-59 (1975).
302. More judicious commentators, like Stengel, who see the fallacy of this inference,
nonetheless remain skeptical about the commonness of rational suicide, largely on the basis
of their work with suicide prevention which benefits often largely confused and desperate
people who do not rationally contemplate suicide. See E. STENGEL, supra note 301, at 125,
132-34. Here, Stengel appears himself fallaciously to reason from an admittedly skewed
sample. His argument that persons who face the same misfortune, for example, terminal
cancer, have different responses-some contemplating suicide, others never doing so-does
not show, as he mistakenly infers, that some uniform response must be rational. It only
shows that persons have very different conceptions of their ends, which may justify different
judgments of rationality on similar facts. See id. at 133. The implicit judgments here of
normality, id. at 58, thus appear to suppress the kinds of fundamental moral distinctions
regarding human individuality which an ethical medical practice should here observe.
303. See id. On successful suicides, see id. at 19-73. On attempted suicides, see id. at 77-
117.
304. See id. at 77-117.
305. Id. at 19-73.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
way; the project of suicide is not, for them, the expression of a
critically evaluated rational life plan, as is shown by the ambiva-
lent nature of their planning."'6 Such persons are the just subjects
of continuing social concern on the ground of just paternalism, for
their conduct, the product of mood and depression, perhaps of
youth, and not of a critically reflective life plan realistically as-
sessed, is the kind of irrationality which, in the presence of irrepa-
rable harm, should trigger intervention. Just concern for such per-
sons has given rise in England to the Samaritans30 7 and in the
United States to suicide prevention centers,30 8 which seek to pro-
vide institutional facilities where such persons are enabled to dis-
cuss their problems, to develop needed perspective on them, to
seek the help which they appear ambivalently to want. Such facili-
ties are part of the kind of intervention that just paternalism ap-
pears to support, for such intervention is not an absolute prohibi-
tion but, at the most, voluntary postponement to encourage
processes of reasonable reflection and dialogue which may better
secure society's ethical interest in ensuring that such conduct is
undertaken rationally.309 Thus there is no inconsistency; rather
there is mutually complementary support between the ethical
grounds for such programs, in the cases to which they properly ap-
ply, and respect for the right of rational self-willed death, in the
cases to which this right properly applies.310 Both conceptions rest
on support and encouragement and respect for capacities of ra-
tional dignity; in the one case, we insure their existence; in the
other, we respect their exercise.
In general, since the ground for programs of suicide intervention
is concern for forms of irrationality, it would be perverse to enforce
such aims through the use of the criminal sanction, which gener-
ally requires, as a condition of just punishment, the presence of
306. For the importance of ambivalence in the psychiatric assessment of the rationality of
suicide behavior, see Motto, The Right to Suicide: A Psychiatrist's View, 3 LvE-THREATEN-
ING BEHAVIOR 183-88 (1972).
307. See E. STENGLm, supra note 301, at 137-49.
308. For the kinds of evaluations and procedures typical of such centers, see generally E.
SCHNEDMAN, N. FARREROw & R. LrruN, Tan PSYCHOLOGY OF SUICME (1970).
309. See note 190 & accompanying text supra.
310. J. CHORON, supra note 208, at 79-82, 96-106, 152-56.
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capacities of rational choice and deliberation. 1  Even if interven-
tion, including stopping the act if possible, may be justified in
some cases of self-willed death,312 criminalization appears wholly
inappropriate to accomplish even such limited aims.
Finally we should remind ourselves that, outside this circum-
scribed area of just paternalistic concern in decisions to die, there
is no ground whatsoever for interference. Paternalistic interest in
such cases represents the kind of unjust influence of moralistic
judgments condemning all such cases which cannot be critically de-
fended consistent with respect for human rights. Special reason to
be suspicious of the motives for such distortions in the case of self-
willed death exists, for it is all too easy to substitute, in the place
of genuine concern for the rational perspective of others on their
own lives and deaths, one's fears of one's own death 13 or one's ego-
istic desires to hold those we love in the world as long as we can.3 14
Dialogue with those who purpose death, urging our point of view,
our needs, as factors in their deliberations, is one of several ways to
deal with such impulses. But there is no ground on which we can
justly express these impulses through absolute prohibitions on all
forms of self-willed death. We must recognize these impulses, how-
ever understandable and natural, for what they are: the desire to
control those we love, to remain the omnipotent and loved child,315
to not be left alone. We should acknowledge these impulses as
needs and try to deal with them honestly; but we, consistent with
human rights, cannot dignify them in terms of a moral imperative
forbidding self-willed death. The justice of our desires to control
even those we love has limits.3 16 Those limits are established by
respect for human rights in terms of which we express our respect
311. See Richards, Human Rights, supra note 23, at 1417, 1428-34.
312. See notes 186-197 & accompanying text supra.
313. One study, for example, indicates that physicians are significantly more afraid of
death than either the healthy or sick lay people. This was the case even though 63% of the
physicians said they were less afraid of death now than they had been heretofore. See Feifel
et al., Physicians Consider Death, Puoc. AL. PSYCH. Assoc. 201-02 (1967).
314. On forms of love bond that disable the lover from realistically perceiving the needs
of the beloved, see M. BALnIT, PRIARy LoV AND PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE 90-140
(1965).
315. Id.
316. These limits importantly govern and regulate the justice of relations of parents to
children, and the converse. See Richards, supra note 275.
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for personal dignity, including the possible dignity of self-willed
death.
7. Wedge Arguments
The nature of wedge arguments for the absolute prohibition of
all decisions to die is to concede, arguendo, the moral force of the
critical arguments above discussed and grant that some cases of
self-willed death may be morally right, but then to argue that
there is no way to express in law or conventional morality this
judgment, for the validation or legitimation of any such conduct
inexorably will be the entering wedge of arguments for killing that
are clearly unethical.31 7 This argument takes two common forms:
first, that any legitimation of voluntary euthanasia will also vali-
date the horrors of Nazi genocide; and second, that even if volun-
tary euthanasia could be validated without this implication, forms
of voluntary euthanasia would be abused in terms of putting pres-
sure on people to die. Neither argument can be sustained.
The former argument is classically stated by Yale Kamisar s'8 in
response to Glanville Williams 19 in a way which brings out the fal-
lacy in the objection. Kamisar claims to agree with Williams that
the scope of the criminal law should be critically assessed and re-
formed in the light of utilitarian objectives. 320 He then claims,
however, that such utilitarian assessment-which would legalize
voluntary euthanasia of the consenting terminally ill on the ground
that, because such persons experience more pain than pleasure in
themselves and cause more pain than pleasure in others, voluntary
euthanasia would maximize pleasure over all-inevitably must ig-
nore the voluntary consent requirement and thus would validate
massive forms of involuntary euthanasia of the defective, whose
elimination might maximize utility over all, which is the rationale
for the racial genocide of Naziism.3 21 Kamisar's argument contains
two distinct objections: first, that the voluntary consent require-
317. For a classic statement of this form of argument, see Kamisar, supra note 40.
318. See id.
319. See notes 38-39 & accompanying text supra.
320. See Kamisar, supra note 40, at 974.
321. Id. at 1014-41.
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ment cannot be made effective; 22 and second, that utilitarianism
justifies euthanasia in other cases besides those of voluntary con-
sent.32 3 Kamisar's objection to an effective institutional embodi-
ment for voluntary consent is technical: how, he argues, can one be
certain that what a terminally ill patient in pain now requests is
what he or she would want if his or her mind were not clouded by
pain, and how can one be sure that what a person says she or he
would want prior to being in such pain is decisive of what they
want when now in pain and unable voluntarily to consent? The
answer, sensibly made by Williams, 2' is that optimally we should
seek both: voluntary consent prior to illness and consent, if possi-
ble, when ill. But clearly, if consent when ill is not possible, for
example, when the person is comatose and unlikely to regain con-
sciousness, the voluntary consent of a person of the requisite form
in certain circumstances, given prior to the nonconsenting state,
might be ethically determinative. As we have seen, other things be-
ing equal, the two conditions of a self-willed death that is not vio-
lative of the natural duties are voluntary consent and reasonable-
ness in terms of the person's own life plan, rationally and freely
adopted and assessed by the person. Surely some kind of formal
consent given under precisely defined legal conditions prior to ill-
ness, like the "living wills" which have already been adopted in
several states, 2 5 would be highly probative on both these ques-
tions; in addition, there must be assurance that there is no over-
322. Id. at 978-1013.
323. Id. at 1014-41.
324. See G. WLLms, supra note 38, at 339-46. See also Williams, Euthanasia Legisla-
tion: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious Objections, in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH
134-47 (A. Downing ed. 1969).
325. At least eight states have adopted a "Natural Death Act" whereby an individual
executes a so-called "living will," Comment, North Carolina's Natural Death Act: Con-
fronting Death with Dignity, 14 WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 771, 774-77 (1978). The seminal
statement in support of the "living will" was Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Liv-
ing Will, a Proposal, 44 hIm. L.J. 539 (1969). See generally Kutner, The Living Will: Coping
with the Historical Event of Death, 27 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 39 (1975). For commentary, see the
articles on the "living will" cited at note 48 supra. See also Kaplan, Euthanasia Legislation:
A Survey and a Model Act, 2 AM. J. LAw & MED. 41-99 (1976); Raible, The Right to Refuse
Treatment and Natural Death Legislation, 5 MICOLEGAL NEWS 6 (1977); Note, The Legal
Aspects of the Right to Die Before and After the Quinlan Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823 (1976-
77); Note, The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care for Patients in a Permanent Vegetative
State, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 285 (1976); Comment, The Living Will: Already a Practical Alter-
native, 55 TEx. L. Rpv. 665 (1977).
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reaching in securing the consent and-independent of con-
sent-that the illness in question is one which the person
reasonably might escape by death, that is, a painful terminal ill-
ness which the person has little probability of surviving in any
event.3
2 6
Kamisar appears to sense the weakness of this technical objec-
tion and moves quickly to a more profound problem in Williams'
argument: the general thrust of Williams' utilitarian argument ex-
tends beyond voluntary euthanasia, narrowly defined in terms of
consent and reasonableness in the circumstances, to involuntary
euthanasia of the defective or the eugenically unfit, and such eu-
thanasia leads to the horrors of Nazi genocide.3 27 It hardly seems
fair to impute to a utilitarian like Williams, who writes in the tra-
dition of liberal utilitarian reform of John Stuart MillM 32 and
H.L.A. Hart, 29 the false and vicious racial theories which were the
actual moral basis for the Nazi programs.330 If utilitarian argu-
ments would legitimate forms of involuntary euthanasia at all, this
legitimization would apply in sharply circumscribed circumstances
which bear not the slightest resemblance to either the Nazi theory
or practice.331 Thus, to the extent that Kamisar uses utilitarianism
as his operative critical morality, he cannot give expression to the
kind of objection he intends.
The objection is true and important; but once we see its moral
basis for what it is, we cannot draw the implications that Kamisar
confusedly does. The objection is that utilitarianism is a manipula-
tive moral theory which does not take seriously treating persons as
326. In this connection, Yale Kamisar argues that medical judgments about terminal ill-
ness and incurability are fallible and that the death of patients should not be a hazard of
medical fallibility. Kamisar, supra note 40, at 993-1013. But surely, the issue is one of rea-
sonable assessment of prognosis on all the available facts. If the person perceives that a
highly probable evil should and will be escaped by death, then there can be no moral objec-
tion to the person's decision to die. Part of such reasonable assessment is, of course, the
possibility of medical fallibility. But once the person is thus apprised and the assessment is
not unreasonable, the relative weight of the probabilities must be left to the person. Wil-
liams, supra note 324, at 134-47. Kamisar's use of the objective mode would here deprive
the person of a right of reasonable judgment which is her or his right.
327. See Kamisar, supra note 40, at 1014-41.
328. See J. MILL, supra note 58.
329. See H. HART, supra note 58.
330. M. KoHL, supra note 156, at 96-100.
331. See discussion of J. Glover and P. Singer at notes 43, 169 supra.
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equals; one mark of this failure is the theoiy's tendency to legiti-
mate involuntary euthanasia of persons if they appear to be suffer-
ing more pain than pleasure and occasioning more pain than plea-
sure in the others who must care for them.332 Indeed, from the
viewpoint of pure utilitarian ethics, the elimination of a person has
no ethical negative significance if pleasure overall is thus ad-
vanced s3 3 as it might be not only by ending the net pain produced
by a defective but replacing him or her by a nondefective person
who produces a net pleasure.33 The proper answer to this objec-
tion is not to retain one's utilitarianism and disavow one's beliefs
about the propriety of voluntary euthanasia and impropriety of in-
voluntary euthanasia, but to question one's intuitive commitment
to utilitarianism and seek a moral theory more adequate to one's
considered moral judgments. 5 We have already suggested one
form of such a theory which expresses an autonomy-based inter-
pretation of treating persons as equals, the substantive moral con-
clusions of which are clearly anti-utilitarian. The consequence of
this theory is"3' that voluntary self-willed death in certain circum-
stances is not morally wrong, but involuntary forms of killing of
persons cannot be ethically justified. Thus we may disavow Wil-
liams' and Kamisar's utilitarianism, disavow entirely any legitima-
tion of involuntary euthanasia of persons, and place voluntary
forms of self-willed death on solid anti-utilitarian ethical founda-
tions with no malign tendency at all.
332. See discussion of J. Glover and P. Singer at notes 43, 169 supra.
333. This intuitively harsh consequence of pure utilitarianism is avoided by both
Jonathan Glover and Peter Singer by somewhat ad hoc and anti-utilitarian devices. For
Glover, this takes the form of his principle of autonomy, whereby creatures with developed
self-consciousness who can and do express wishes to live are given enormous weight, which,
for him, outweighs countervailing utilitarian consequences which might, absent the enor-
mous normative weight given autonomy, require death. J. GLOVER, supra note 43, at 74-85.
In similar fashion, Peter Singer claims that "persons" with self-consciousness have a kind of
overwhelming normative weight which gives them, should they want continued life, a kind
of right to it. P. SINGER, supra note 43, at 72-92. For both theorists, since young infants, for
example, lack such self-consciousness, they have no such weight, for their lives are thus
subject to utilitarian calculations of the normal kinds. For commentary, see notes 43, 169
supra.
334. For the idea of replacement, see J. GLOVER, supra note 43, at 72-73, 159-60, 163. See
also P. SINGER, supra note 43, at 122-26, 130-39.
335. See text accompanying notes 1-342 supra and infra.
336. See notes 154-174 & accompanying text supra.
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There remains one form of the wedge argument which we should
consider briefly: that even if we limit permissible kiling to circum-
scribed forms of voluntary euthanasia and the like, the legitima-
tion of voluntary euthanasia by law or social convention will lead
to abusive manipulation of persons to encourage them, when old
and dependent, to avail themselves of this option3 7-freeing their
children, for example,- of the burdens of care and passing on the
estate that the children regard as their due. Now, of course, it is a
mark of rights that they can be abused;338 but before we permit the
possibility of abuse to compromise our definition of rights, we must
make sure that the forms of such abuse are not unfairly likely and
cannot be minimized by ways of conditioning the exercise of such
rights. Certainly, manipulative enticement of such kinds, in con-
temporary circumstances of affluence and longevity, would be abu-
sively wrong.3 9 But in contemporary life, forms of social security,
pension benefits, and the like make the life of older people, in con-
trast to previous historical periods,80 sufficiently independent that
they cannot be regarded, in general, as unfairly manipulable by the
young. If we are concerned about abuse of the old here, surely we
should be concerned not to compromise their rights, but as a just
society, further to guarantee the independent well-being of older
citizens341 so that they retain in old age an autonomous dignity
which does not make them easy prey to the callousness of the
young. In addition, we may minimize the incidence of this kind of
abuse by conditioning the exercise of the right in certain ways, re-
337. See Kamisar, supra note 40, at 990-93. See also Foot, supra note 163, at 38-39.
338. See Richards, Human Rights and Moral Ideals: An Essay on the Moral Theory of
Liberalism, 5 SOCIAL THEORY & PRAc. 461-88 (1980).
339. Philippa Foot suggests that such forms of enticement might have a quite different
moral status in "an extremely poverty stricken community where the children genuinely
suffered from lack of food." Foot, supra note 163, at 39.
340. In preindustrial society, parental dependence on children in old age was extreme, for
the child provided parents with "a form of social security, unemployment insurance, and
yearly support." J. KErr, RrrES op PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT
23 (1977).
341. One aspect of such concern would be to relieve impersonality in the process of dying,
a contemporary inhumanity of some magnitude. See note 287 supra. Perhaps such concern
would lend some reasonably to put aside willing their own death. Perhaps others would,
with appropriate understanding, more reasonably embrace self-willed death. In any event,
on grounds of justice, persons should have such support in their moments of dying, no mat-
ter what influence it has on the exercise of their rights.
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quiring, for example, a showing that no form of overreaching has
occurred before the requirement of voluntariness can be met or im-
posing a stringent requirement that the action be reasonable in
terms of the independently assessed life plan of the person, as, for
example, with a painful terminal illness. If such conditions are
met, we must respect the dignity of choice of older persons,
whatever the ingredients, altruistic or egoistic, of their
deliberations. 42
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO DIE
So far the argument has been pointedly negative: we have expli-
cated the moral right to life in terms of the intersecting require-
ments of three principles of natural duty-nonmaleficence, mutual
aid, and paternalism-and shown that the moral right to life does
not include all cases of self-willed death; and we have analyzed the
critical moves in various traditional and contemporary arguments
claimed to justify absolute prohibitions of all decisions to die and
shown that they do not work. We must now put these analyses to a
constructive use in defining an affirmative right, the right to die,
and show why this right is embraced b' the constitutional right to
privacy.
Let us begin by focusing our earlier arguments on the explication
of the constitutional right to privacy. As I have argued else-
where, 43 the constitutional right to privacy is best interpreted,
consistent with the human rights perspective embodied in the Con-
stitution, as a way of subjecting the scope of the criminal law to
constitutional assessment and criticism in terms of the autonomy-
based interpretation of treating persons as equals. In a constitu-
tional democracy committed to the conception of human rights as
the unwritten constitution,344 in terms of which the meaning of
342. Williams observes in this connection:
If a patient, suffering pain in a terminal illness, wishes for euthanasia partly
because of his pain and partly because he sees his beloved ones breaking under
the strain of caring for him, I do not see how this decision on his part, agoniz-
ing though it may be, is necessarily a matter of discredit either to the patient
himself or to his relatives.
Williams, supra note 324, at 138.
343. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 12, at 964-72.
344. See id. at 958-64.
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constitutional guarantee is to be construed, it is wholly natural and
historically consistent with constitutional commitments to regard
the autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as equals as
the regulative ideal in terms of which the "public morality," which
the criminal law expresses, is to be interpreted. Sometimes this
thought has been expressed, as a rough first approximation, in
terms of the harm principle, namely that the state may only im-
pose criminal sanctions on conduct which harms others, a point
made by the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citi-
zens345 and by John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.4 e This article has
tried to reformulate the thought in terms of the autonomy-based
interpretation of treating persons as equals and has tried to show
how such a conception imposes specific constraints on the kinds of
principles which permissibly may be enforced by the "public mo-
rality," for example, the moral principles of obligation and duty, of
which the principles of natural duty relevant to the moral struc-
ture of the right to life are one subset. The traditional idea of
"harm" appears to support the right to life-for example,
nonmaleficence requires that one not inflict certain harms on other
persons-but the idea of harm clearly is interpreted, in contrast to
Mill's utilitarian formulation, 47 in terms of the rights of the
person.
Now a natural consequence of this way of thinking is that, when
the scope of the criminal law exceeds such moral constraints on the
proper interpretation of the "public morality," the criminal law vi-
olates human rights; it limits the scope of liberty and dignified life
choice in ways that fail to respect the neutral theory of the good
and the capacity of persons to define their own lives. Introduced
into the criminal law are idiosyncratic and parochial ideologies
which do not rise to the level of the moral reasoning which alone
may be enforced by the criminal law.3 48 The constitutional right to
privacy expresses a form of this moral criticism of unjust over-
criminalization and may be explicated in terms of the intersection
345. See notes 56-57 & accompanying text supra.
346. See J. MILL, supra note 58.
347. For a fuller examination of the contrast between this view and Mill's argument, see
Richards, supra note 338, at 465-80. See also Richards, Human Rights, supra note 23, at
1421-28.
348. See authorities cited note 102 supra.
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of three variables:349 (1) the antimoralistic strain that the forms of
traditional moral argument, supposed to justify a certain form of
criminalization, are critically deficient and demonstrably fail to
take the proper form which respect for human rights requires; (2)
the antipaternalistic feature that the extant force of the valid
traditional moral arguments, in popular or conventional morality,
distorts persons' capacity to see that certain traditionally con-
demned life choices may be rationally undertaken and encourages
them to justify paternalistic interference therein; and (3) a strong
autonomy-based interest in protecting human dignity from (1) and
(2), since the liberty in question relates to a basic life choice
around which people may organize their personhood.
The previously stated negative arguments-both regarding the
moral structure of the right to life not extending to all forms of
self-willed death and the criticisms of the traditional moral argu-
ments supposed to condemn all such acts-make clear that both
the antimoralistic and antipaternalistic strains of the constitu-
tional right to privacy apply to certain decisions to die. While our
legal system no longer tends to criminalize suicide as such,350 it
does forbid aiding and abetting suicide " and all forms of euthana-
sia,3 52 whether voluntary or involuntary. Now, as we have seen, no
good moral argument to sustain such absolute prohibitions exists.
Because of the force of the traditional moral condemnation in the
conventional morality which the law supports, persons abusively
are tempted to suppose that persons cannot rationally wish and
undertake their deaths and that, therefore, paternalistic interfer-
ence is always justified.
It is natural that the application of the constitutional right to
privacy has surfaced in cases like In re Quinlan,353 Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,s" and In re Eichner
349. For amplification of these variables, see Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 12,
at 964-1014.
350. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, Ja., supra note 200, at 568-70.
351. Id. at 570-71.
352. See note 203 supra.
353. 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div.), rev'd, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
354. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
355. 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979), modified and afl'd sub nom. Eichner v.
Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
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In two of these cases, Quinlan and Eichner, we have irreversibly
comatose and essentially vegetative patients and reason to believe
that each, in such circumstances, would want to be allowed to die;
in the third, Saikewicz, we have the prospect of painful treatments
of a terminally ill person who, being mentally incompetent, lacks
rational capacity to consent. Let us focus here on Quinlan and
Eichner, in which the underlying moral argument, interpreted in
terms of the theory here proposed, appears strongest.356 In these
cases, we may pose the issue in terms of the natural duty of mutual
aid: does the principle of relieving harm, when accomplished at lit-
tle cost to oneself, bind the medical professional to continue these
persons on life-sustaining equipment? There is clearly no back-
ground duty or obligation which here might require continued life,
for there is no general obligation of social service, fairly and recip-
rocally incurred, and no special moral obligation to determinate
third parties-neither of them were parents, let alone parents of
still young children-which either person had still to render or, for
that matter, the comatose state being irreversible,57 could render.
356. Saikewicz involves a 67-year-old profoundly retarded ward of the State of Massachu-
setts, who was terminally ill with leukemia. Chemotherapy, which statistically caused remis-
sion in 30-50% of the cases for periods ranging from 2 to 13 months, was medically indi-
cated, though it would cause Saikewicz adverse side effects and discomfort. Based upon the
patient's inability to provide informed consent for the chemotherapy treatment and his in-
ability to understand the treatment, a guardian was appointed who recommended his not
being treated on the grounds that it was in his best interests. 373 Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d
at 419. The court in Saikewicz upheld the guardian's recommendations on the ground of the
constitutional right to privacy if the declining of the life-prolonging treatment was in his
actual interests. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 435. On the view here proposed, this result is
morally problematic since there is not actual consent nor was anyone reasonably apprised of
what a reasonable person's consent would here have been since Saikewicz never had the
capacity for informed consent. Saikewicz' lack of understanding of the effects and discom-
fort does not, in these circumstances, wholly rebut one's moral doubts about here not giving
treatment which would, absent the retardation, have been medically indicated. On what
ground, ethically, are we, the nonretarded, entitled to impute consent to Saikewicz when, in
the case of a comparable nonretarded person, chemotherapy would normally be indicated?
357. Neither Quinlan nor Brother Joseph Fox were dead by the brain death criterion of
the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, which requires no discernible cen-
tral nervous system activity. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine
the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, in ETHicAL ISSUES IN
DEATH AND DYING 11-18 (T. Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978). The criterion arose from
advances in medical technology, which could sustain respiratory and heart function-the
traditional indicia of life-even in the absence of capacity for brain function. Previously, the
cessation of breathing and heart function had been correlated with lack of brain function.
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While the voluntary consent of Ms. Quinlan appears not to have
been as considered and rationally given as that of Brother Joseph
Fox in Eichner,355 a good case for such consent can be made, and
in both cases, continued life appears to be something neither
would reasonably want. Thus both the stipulated conditions of
proper forms of self-willed death are here satisfied: voluntary con-
sent and reasonableness in terms of the person's life plan.3 5  Ac-
cordingly, to save either of their lives would here not be relieving
harm, as contemplated by the principle of mutual aid, and there
would be no breach of mutual aid by not prolonging life. Indeed to
insist in such cases that life be prolonged would appear to rest on
the kind of paternalistic distortion which we have earlier noted.
Since in such cases both antimoralistic and antipaternalistic fea-
tures of the constitutional right to privacy are in play, we have a
putative candidate for the application of the right. But, how can
death be regarded as a basic life choice?
See Black, Definitions of Brain Death, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 5-10 (T.
Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978). The Harvard criterion has been criticized both for not
being permissive enough and for being too permissive. The former criticism focuses on the
fact that the Harvard criterion allows total brain death to mark "death" when there has
been irreversible loss of the cerebral neocortex's function on which the capacities of critical
self-consciousness turn. Thus, the proper criterion should be the narrower one of loss of
neocortex function. See Veatch, Defining Death Anew: Technical and Ethical Problems, in
ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 19-38. (T. Beachcamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978). The latter
criticism argues that loss of brain function should not cavalierly be assumed to be the mark
of "death" because this disengages concepts of the "person" too sharply from the living
body and may allow the taking of body. organs for transplants. Jonas, Against the Stream:
Comments on the Definition and Redefinition of Death, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND
DYING 51-60 (T. Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978). See Schwager, Life, Death, and the
Irreversibly Comatose, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 38-50 (T. Beachamp & S.
Perlin eds. 1978). For a balanced proposal for incorporating brain death into revised legal
conceptions of death, see Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for De-
termining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND
DYING 60-75 (T. Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978).
358. Brother Joseph Fox had expressed to close friends both at the time of the Karen
Quinlan situation and shortly before being hospitalized his considered view that his life not
be sustained if he were in the Quinlan situation. In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, -, 423
N.Y.S.2d 580, 586 (1979), modified and aff'd sub nom. Eicbner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). In this Brother Joseph expressly affirmed a Catholic view to which he
was, as a religious man, conscientiously committed. In Quinlan, Karen Quinlan had not
affirmed such a view in so focused and considered a way, but the court found her father's
judgment sufficiently based in understanding of his daughter's wishes to warrant his enforc-
ing the privacy right on her behalf. See 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 664.
359. See notes 154-174 & accompanying text supra.
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IV. THE RIGHT TO Dm AND THE MEANING OF LIFE
In order to understand why certain decisions to die must be em-
braced within the constitutional right to privacy, we should draw
together disparate observations made earlier regarding the idea of
human rights, the values of dignity and moral personality that it
protects, and the necessary implications of this idea and these val-
ues for the protection of certain decisions to die. Even if such deci-
sions to die in fact were never exercised or exercised only rarely,
the right to so decide is, for reasons now to be explained,
fundamental.
A common feature of serious critical reflection on one's life, in-
deed the kind of critical reflection fundamental to our being per-
sons with what I have called autonomy, is that ordinary people of
good will pose the issues in terms of the query: what is the mean-
ing of life? The weightiness of this question for persons is posed, I
believe, by our capacity as persons for self-consciousness and by
the consequent and inexorable thought that we will die. If per-
sonhood gives us the capacity of higher-order reflection on and
evaluation of our system of ends and how they cohere in a life, the
terms of that reflection and evaluation are posed by the thought of
our death, the formal constraint which circumscribes the design of
our life, and by the need to make sense of death.
When traditional methods of rationalizing death no longer ap-
pear true or valid, people naturally express this loss of faith in
terms of the meaninglessness of life or the associated thought that,
without such meaning, suicide is called for. Dostoevsky's Kirillov
argues that if God is dead, man is God, and he, the first man-God,
shows his Godhead by suicide.3 60 Camus, finding life absurd be-
cause empty of providential redemptive meaning, poses, as the first
question of philosophy, why-in the face of meaninglessness-not
commit suicide?"'
Why should this be so: why should the fact that one's death is
final without personal immorality, as Kirillov and Camus and
many other moderns assume, imply or be taken to imply that one's
life is meaningless in some haunted and harrowing way? The natu-
360. See F. DOSTOEVSKY, THE Possssa 93-98, 524-39 (A. Yarmolinsky trans. 1936).
361. A. CAmUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUs 3-13, 39-44, 76-83 (J. O'Brien trans. 1955).
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ralness of the inference is based, I believe, on this: that because we,
as persons, are critically self-conscious of our lives as a whole over
time, which includes death which defeats and frustrates the
projects on which we center our lives, 362 making sense of death ap-
pears to be an inexorable part of making sense of life; if death is
senseless, life may be senseless too.
Of course there is a stark non sequitur in this inference: it is the
fallacy of supposing that because one system of beliefs, which
places death in the framework of personal immortality and inter-
prets one's life in terms of this framework, is no longer accepted as
true or valid, that all alternative systems of belief and value must
be similarly hollow and incoherent. This supposition is flatly false:
it expresses a failure of imagining and constructing new systems of
belief and value in terms of a self-fulfilling romantic desperation
about the task of giving meaning to life at all.3 3
The idea, the meaning of life, is ambiguous, and this romantic
desperation plays on the ambiguity.3" On the one hand, the idea of
life's meaning may be interpreted in terms of teleological purpose
externally defined and specified, like books which have the purpose
of being read or buildings of affording shelter, and the like; this
interpretation is externally defined in terms of the purposes of the
creator or user of the artifact in question, which may be God or
Nature.6 5 On the other hand, life's meaning may be interpreted in
terms of the structure of evaluations which the person imposes on
and expresses through the structure of her or his living; in this
sense, the meaning of life is not interpreted in terms of teleological
purpose externally defined, but in terms of the purposes of the
362. See notes 147-153 & accompanying text supra.
363. The perception of absurdity arises from and expresses, as an ultimate metaphysical
fact, a common fact of self-critical evaluation of one's life, namely that a certain range of
assumptions of personal significance in which one invests one's energies and aspirations pas-
sionately appears, on examination, to lack any justification that one can reasonably affim.
T. NAGEL, MORAL QUESTIONS 11-16 (1979). In this case, however, the fact that certain as-
sumptions are shown to be invalid, rather than expressing a perception limited to those
assumptions mistakenly is taken to render invalid, without examination or argument, all
alternative assumptions which one might construct or avow.
364. See, e.g., K. BAlER, THE MEA G OF LmT (1957). See also Edwards, Life, Meaning
and Value of, 4 ENcY. OF Pum. 467-77 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
365. See K. BAIFR, supra note 364, at 3-24.
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person s 66-the idea, certainly close to the core of linguistic or lan-
guage meaning, that an expression is meaningful in virtue of the
intentions which it is known and purposed to communicate. 67 The
romantic desperation of Kirillov and Camus and others6 8 uses the
defeat of teleological purpose as a way of defining life's meaning
(because of disbelief in a personal God or in personal immortality)
in an argument that, therefore, the meaning of life, in the form of
personal evaluation, is empty. But the argument is a non sequitur.
Indeed it may be precisely because life is meaningless in the teleo-
logical sense that there is such weight to be placed on personal
meaning, as the proper task of a human life. 69
This personal sense of the meaning of life is at one with the
ideas of personal autonomy and rational personhood which, I have
argued, are the central values in terms of which human rights are
to be interpreted. On this view, it is an open question, consistent
with the neutral theory of the good, how persons, with freedom
and rationality, will define the meaning of their lives, and no exter-
nally defined teleological script is entitled to any special authority
or weight in such personal self-definition. Once we see the issue in
this way, we can see that the fact of one's own death frames the
meaning one gives one's life in widely differing ways.
Sometimes psychologists3 7 0 and philosophers3 71 claim that the
thought of one's death is in some way impossible for us, a claim
that may rest on the startling confusion between the content of the
366. See id. at 24-29.
367. See generally S. SCHIFFER, MEANING (1972).
368. See also Tolstoy, Death and the Meaning of Life, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND
DYING 317-24 (T. Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978).
369. See K. BAIER, supra note 364, at 24-29. See also K. BRITTON, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
MEANING OF LIFE 51-215 (1969).
370. Sigmund Freud articulated this view:
It is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to
do so we can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators. Hence the
psycho-analytic school could venture on the assertion that at bottom no one
believes in his own death, or, to put the same thing in another way, that in the
unconscious every one of us is convinced of his own immortality.
Freud, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, in 14 STANDARD EDITION, supra note
284, at 289.
371. Compare the discussion in Edwards, My Death, in 5 ENCY. OF PHIL. 416-19 (P. Ed-
wards ed. 1967). For a recent example of such a philosopher, see P. DEVINE, supra note 166,
at 24-31.
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thought of one's death, which has nothing to do with one's contin-
ued life, and one's having this thought, which requires one to be
alive. 2 Surely the claim is not true; indeed, the mark of per-
sonhood is that one frames the issue of how to live -one's life by
death and one plans accordingly, as any estate lawyer will attest.
The meaning of one's life is defined by one's projects, by the evalu-
ative organization of one's ends and aspirations in a plan of life
which express one's sense of self-respect in the competences, con-
tributions, and relationships in which one centers one's person,
one's sense of a life well and humanely lived. One's death plays
innumerable roles in this process: it provides, for example, the
sense of a mortal life plan so that hard choices must be made
about the use of time, about the life cycle and tasks appropriate
thereto, about the developmental subordination and complemen-
tarity of tasks;7 3 it suggests the need to reflect about projects that
one wishes to survive one, and how this need may best fulfill one's
sense of values that should endure-for example, the belief in edu-
cation, charity, or artistic cultivation; it raises the whole question
of dying and the issue of dying in a way one finds meaningful. 4
Since persons, as such, have broad latitude to define the digni-
fied meaning of their lives, they must have, consistent therewith,
the corollary right to define the meaning of their deaths, including,
other things being equal, forms of self-willed death which are con-
sistent with treating persons as equals. Indeed, I believe, a natural
feature of the striking normative attitude that human rights take
to the person is that reflection on one's death may, ethically, ap-
propriately cultivate the kind of evaluative scrutiny of and respon-
sibility for the living of one's life that personhood calls for,375 in
the way that Tolstoy's Ivan Ilych comes critically to see the empti-
ness of his successful and complaisant conventionalism only in the
372. See Edwards, supra note 371. See also M. DE UNAMUNO, TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE 38-57
(1954).
373. See D. RICHARDS, REASONS FOR ACTION, supra note 19, at 27-48. See also C. FRIED,
supra note 88, at 155-82.
374. The role of one's death in living an authentic personal life is the central perception
of Martin Heidegger's philosophical system. See M. HEIDEGGER, BmNG AND TME (J. Maz-
quarrie & E. Robinson trans. 1962). For forceful criticism, see P. EDWARDS, HEmEGGER ON
DEATH: A CRTmCAL EvALUATION (Monist Monograph No. 1 1979).
375. H. FEDDEN, supra note 159, at 285, 287-88, 312.
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prospect of his death. 7 6 Indeed consistent with such considera-
tions, the concern for personal responsibility, fundamental to
human rights, appears to support an affirmative moral interest in
encouraging persons to reflect on the kinds of considerations, if
any, that would lead them reasonably to depart life. Certainly
when the cultivation of critical self-consciousness as an end in it-
self enters human thought with the rise of philosophy in ancient
Athens, one finds concomitantly an elaboration of the vocabulary
and concepts of self-willed death-3 7 as one natural subject of criti-
cal reflection. How could it be otherwise? Through such critical re-
flection, even if most people would not have occasion to depart in
fact or would rarely find such departure reasonable, they would af-
firm and express, as reflective persons with responsibility for or-
dering the projects of their life, the meaning, the uncompromisable
values, on which they center their integrity.
Certainly, consistent with the neutral theory of the good,3 78 per-
sons will meet this task in widely disparate ways. Some persons
who, as free and rational beings, adopt the Augustinian script
would thus affirm the values of the sanctity of suffering, on which
they center their lives, 37 '9 for they would see the right to die as one
they could not, consistent with their integrity, exercise. Others,
however, would better understand and articulate the values of
their rational dignity by seeing that, their dignity being more rea-
sonably achieved by death than continued life in certain circum-
stances, holding to life in such cases would be the shallowest
fetishism.
Through acknowledging the right to die, in cases to which it
properly applies, we secure to persons the fundamental human
right upon which they may call their life their own, guaranteeing to
them the kind of independent responsibility in ordering and revis-
ing their ends, as free and rational beings, that enables them to
affirm both in life and death the meanings of their integrity. Per-
haps because our law does not acknowledge this right, we have lost
376. L. TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH AND OTHER STORIES 95-156 (A. Maude trans.
1960).
377. See Daube, supra note 215, at 390-94, 399-405.
378. For the range of possible attitudes in the western tradition, see J. CHORON, DEATH
AND WESTERN THOUGHT (1963).
379. See note 251 supra.
[Vol. 22:327
THE RIGHT TO DIE
the capacity for serene lucidity before death, the kind of moving
affirmation of the integrity of one's values that one often finds in
those who accept this right, for example, the Stoics 38 0 and David
Hume.381 Instead we isolate death from life, rendering unspeakable
and unspoken the personal meaning that a person has a right to
bring to death s2 as she or he does to life. 8
Kant, the greatest philosopher of human rights, senses this
point, from which he inexplicably draws back when he notes the
remarkable independence of mind which the Stoic doctrine of self-
willed death reflects: "lie recks neither king nor torments";38 4 and
Rousseau, consistent in the face of a conventional wisdom which
even Kant could not resist, senses that if there is not this right
"there is no human action which might not be made a crime."385
The right is, within the limits described earlier, the right to decide
to die when this decision more rationally fulfills one's projects, rea-
sonably and freely affirmed in a coherent and considered plan of
life.
In contrast to the Thomist and Kantian claim that self-willed
death places man beneath the animals,8 6 I would argue that it is
the mark of our dignity as persons, our capacity to build a mean-
ingful life, and to depart it when it cannot realistically meet our
reasonable demands. 87 In this, we show ourselves neither the
property of God or the state or our children, but as persons who
may best express, as ends in themselves, as an expression of ra-
380. See notes 159-160, 208, 286 supra.
381. See note 227 supra. For an illustration of Hume's remarkable contentment in his last
months, see D. HUME, My Own Life, in HumE's DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION
239 (N. Smith ed. 1935). The letter from Adam Smith to William Strahan describing
Hume's last months is reprinted in 2 TiE LErTRs OF DAVID HuME 450-52 (J. Greig ed.
1932). The last-mentioned book contains the remarkable letter from Hume to Edward Gib-
bon upon reading the first volume of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, which
appeared while Hume was dying. Id. at 309-11.
382. See J. HLLMAN, SUICIDE AND THE SOUL (1964).
383. See note 287 supra on the impersonality of contemporary modes of dying. See also
G. GoRER, DEATH, GRIEF, AND MOURNING IN CoNTEMPoRARY BRITAIN (1965); GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHIATRY, THE RIGHT TO DIE: DECISION AND DECISION MAKERS (1974).
384. I. KANT, supra note 256, at 153.
385. J. RoussEAu, LA NOUVELLE HELOISE 264 (1968).
386. See text accompanying note 256 supra.
387. H. FEDDEN, supra note 159, at 285, 287-88, 312. This concept of self-willed death,
built on rights of the person, has nothing to do with forms of institutional suicide which
deny such rights. See id. at 16-26.
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tional self-mastery and dignity, the meaning we give our lives by
ending them.
V. THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY IN EFFECTUATING THE
RIGHT TO DIE
We have now completed our argument both for the existence of
a moral and human right to die and the proper place of the consti-
tutional right to privacy in effectuating it. Constitutional privacy
rests on the three variables: (1) antimoralistic critique of existing
laws as not resting on moral judgments that can be sustained rea-
sonably in terms of the constitutionally authoritative mandate of
the autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as equals;
(2) antipaternalistic distortions, which tend-because of the con-
ventional moral judgments still widely held and enforced by law '
-to make people interfere in conduct because it is assumed to be
irrational; and (3) an area of life choice in which the protection of
autonomy from the incursions of (1) and (2) defends centrally im-
portant forms of dignity. Constitutional privacy is the right
deployed as a prophylaxis against the injustices of (1) and (2) in
the protection of (3). Since both (1) and (2) apply in the case of
certain decisions to die, and since such decisions appear to effectu-
ate a central dignity in life choice (3), constitutional privacy, cor-
rectly understood, embraces the right to die.
But, to what extent may the full scope of this right to die prop-
erly be enforced by the constitutional right to privacy? Certainly,
as we have observed, the right was properly invoked in In re Quin-
lan s 9 and In re Eichner.3 90 While both cases may be justified
forms of voluntary euthanasia, they involve forms of so-called
"passive" euthanasia-letting die through withdrawal of life-sup-
port systems of "extraordinary" kinds-which have the approval of
even religions which claim to rest on Augustinian doctrine. 91 What
388. One perceptive commentator identifies the "suburban spirit" as a form of wide-
spread and unreasoned social prejudice against forms of self-willed death. Id. at 230, 248-49.
389. 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div.), rev'd, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
390. 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979), modified and aff'd sub noma. Eichner v.
Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
391. See the address of Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation of Life, Address of Pope Pius
XII to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists," November 24, 1957, AAS XXXXIX
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is the proper procedure in these "passive" euthanasia cases, and to
what extent should constitutional privacy embrace more controver-
sial cases of voluntary active euthanasia, that is, killing, and ex-
emption in some cases from criminal liability for aiding and abet-
ting suicide? Even if we grant the existence of the moral right to
die in certain cases beyond voluntary passive euthanasia, is the
constitutional right to privacy the way to effectuate this right?
On the view here proposed, these issues would be assessed in
terms of the relevant moral principles of natural duty-
nonmaleficence, mutual aid, and paternalism-and background
moral obligations which qualify the scope of these principles. Cases
like Quinlan and Eichner are appropriate because voluntary con-
sent and reasonableness for the person, as grounds for exemption
from mutual aid, are reasonably established, and in those cases
there are no relevant background moral obligations, for example,
parenthood of a young child. It is important to see that the ethical
justification for such cases here turns on mutual aid, a moral prin-
ciple with special relevance to determining the moral duties of
health care professionals and hospitals.39 2 Since such persons and
institutions are in the business of mutual aid, it appears important
that institutional schemes be designed so that they may meet their
duties and understand clearly when voluntary passive euthanasia
is called for. Accordingly, the Quinlan scheme seems appropriate if
we interpret it in this way: both consent and reasonableness may
be inferred from written consent of intimates who know the pa-
tient, and the hospital committee is to make clear that the patient
is irretrievably comatose (on the issue of reasonableness). The
presence of a court order, as in Eichner,3 93 appears cumbersome
and pointless. Of course, if the Quinlan conditions are not met,
criminal liability would lie.
(1957) (translation from the original French, "The Pope Speaks," Spring 1958, vol. 4, no. 4,
pp. 393-98).
392. See notes 183-185 & accompanying text supra. See also notes 198-199 & accompany-
ing text supra.
393. 73 A.D.2d at -, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550. The court in Eichner adopts the procedure
from Saikewicz. On the morally problematic facts of Saikewicz, see note 356 supra, some
such more extraordinary procedure might be required if we assume (which is problematic)
that any such procedure at all is justified. The moral status of Saikewicz and Eichner, how-
ever, are completely different, and there is no ground for importing the moral ambiguities of
the former into the latter.
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One must understand that voluntary passive euthanasia cases of
this kind importantly rest ethically on mutual aid and on the ex-
emption conditions from mutual aid. Ethically, mutual aid hap-
pens to be of direct relevance to cases of letting die, though the
idea of letting die is stretched, in a Pickwickian way, to denomi-
nate taking off a respirator as a form of letting die.39 4 Whether we
interpret taking off the respirator as an act or omission, it is ethi-
cally right in such circumstances because there is an exemption
from the requirements of mutual aid.
Voluntary active euthanasia poses a different moral issue not be-
cause it calls for an act versus an omission but because, in contrast
to passive euthanasia, it rests on the prohibitions of the natural
duty of nonmaleficence, which has a broader application than mu-
tual aid to all persons rather than, as with mutual aid, mainly to
health professionals. For this reason, it seems to me morally mis-
taken to regard cases of voluntary active euthanasia as, in any
sense, the special responsibility of health care professionals. Volun-
tary active euthanasia is an ethical issue which any legal reforma-
tion would wisely remove from medical execution, as opposed to
pertinent medical advice.
Sometimes, the distinction between voluntary active and volun-
tary passive euthanasia is expressed in terms of the supposedly op-
erative moral distinction between killing, which is always wrong,
and letting die, which sometimes is right. 5 There are in some
cases moral distinctions between killing and letting die; 9 ' but the
proper moral force of the distinction is expressed not in terms of
an absolute moral prohibition in the one case and a sometime per-
mission in the other, 97 but in terms of the different requirements
394. See, e.g., Fletcher, Prolonging Life, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 226-40
(R. Weir ed. 1977).
395. G. KELLY, MEDICO-MORAL PROBLEMS 20 (1955). See C. McFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHICS
27-33 (1962); T. O'DONNELL, MORALS IN MEDICINE 39-44 (1959); N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, THE
RIGHT TO LIFE 71 (1963).
396. See, e.g., Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in
KILLING AND LETTING Dm 156-65 (B. Steinbock ed. 1980).
397. One criticism of the doctrine expounded in the works cited in note 395 supra, has
been that there is no morally relevant distinction at all between killing and letting die. See,
e.g., Bennett, Whatever the Consequences, in KILLING AND LETTING DIE 109-27 (B.
Steinbock ed. 1980). However, there appear to be some cases in which there is a morally and
legally important distinction. See Dinello, On Killing and Letting Die, in KILLING AND LET-
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and applications of the principles of nonmaleficence and mutual
aid.3 98 Sometimes it does make a moral difference that one has
killed, rather than let die;399 but, sometimes there is no moral dif-
ference at all.40 0 In particular, on the issue of voluntary euthanasia,
there are cases in which, given the requisite conditions of volun-
tary consent and reasonableness to the person and no pertinent
background moral obligations, it would be no more wrong to kill
the person than to let the person die, for, in both cases, there
would be an exemption from the pertinent scope of the relevant
principles of natural duty-nonmaleficence, mutual aid, and
paternalism.0 1
Sometimes it is argued that though there is no controlling ethi-
cal distinction in certain cases of voluntary active and passive eu-
thanasia, passive euthanasia is consistent with the proper medical
ethic of care and concern for the dying in a way in which active
euthanasia is not. 02 While, as an abstractly conceived ethical mat-
ter, it may be no more caring for the person to let them die rather
than acquiesce in their request to end their lives-and in some
cases it may be much less caring if the criterion is, as it should be,
the reasonably expressed wishes of the person 4 0s-there is no good
ethical reason why the exemption from nonmaleficence should be
enforced by medical professionals, whose whole ethical orientation
TING DIE 128-31 (B. Steinbock ed. 1980). See also Fitzgerald, Acting and Refraining, in
MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDicINE 284-89 (S. Gorovitz et al., eds. 1976).
398. Philippa Foot has made this point in terms of more stringent duties of not harming
and less stringent duties of rendering aid. See Foot, supra note 396, at 156-65. See also
Foot, supra note 163, at 25-32. Foot's way of making the distinction may not be fully accu-
rate. See note 180 supra. See also Davis, The Priority of Avoiding Harm, in KILLING AND
LETTING DIE 172-214 (B. Steinbock ed. 1980); Russell, On the Relative Strictness of Nega-
tive and Positive Duties, in KILLNG AND LETTING DIE 215-231 (B. Steinbock ed. 1980).
399. See note 398 supra. For example, whereas it might clearly violate nonmaleficence to
kill a person, there might be no violation of mutual aid in letting him die if the cost of aid
was very high.
400. See, e.g., Rachels, Euthanasia, Killing and Letting Die, in ETHICAL IssuES RELATING
To Ln; AND DEATH 146-63 (J. Ladd ed. 1979).
401. See notes 154-174 & accompanying text supra.
402. See P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 113-64 (1970). Ramsey appears to acknowl-
edge that the force of the prohibition on killing is, for him, a religious ideal about proper
dying. Id. at 153, 160.
403. Even Ramsey appears to acknowledge some exceptions to the justness of his prohibi-
tion on killing. Id. at 161-64.
19811
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
is defined by mutual aid and its requirements.0 4 Certainly in cases
of terminally ill persons who request death, medical advice would
be appropriate on the issue of the reasonable probability of death
and the unlikelihood of cure, which is relevant to exemption from
nonmaleficence (on the issue of the reasonableness of the request).
But once such advice is given and painless ways of ending life sug-
gested, it would be more consistent with the ethics of medicine if
the infliction of death were left to others.405
But if this is so, if indeed persons in such cases have a clear
moral and human right to die, should the constitutional right to
privacy protect both the active and passive forms of voluntary eu-
thanasia? There is reason to doubt whether the constitutional right
to privacy would be the appropriate way to enforce the right to die
in all the cases to which it applies. Constitutional privacy is, after
all, the creature of judicial reasoning and enforcement, and it is
doubtful whether judicial enforcement would be a reasonable way
to effectuate the right to die in all cases.
If, as I have suggested, voluntary active euthanasia is not an ap-
propriate demand to make of medical professionals, there is obvi-
ously a need for some alternative procedure to effectuate the right
in a suitably circumscribed way:( some system of "living wills"
which extends to active euthanasi ,4 6 consultation with intimates
to make sure that death is what the person reasonably wants, some
facility or training for how to administer death painlessly, perhaps
some showing that, in the patient's context, there is no way for her
or him to inflict death on her or his own,407 and the like. Many
such alternative schemes could be imagined, but they all seem
more appropriately the objects of a legislative scheme than some
judicial innovation. In the absence of such schemes, courts would
have to rest content with enunciating, in some clear cases of volun-
404. Compare the similar argument in T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 131, at
112-17.
405. Both Montaigne and St. Thomas More, discuss the role of public officials in monitor-
ing decisions to die. See note 286 supra.
406. Such "living wills" currently apply to forms of passive euthanasia. See authorities
cited note 325 supra.
407. This might be a way of insuring the voluntariness of the person and absence of over-
reaching by interested third parties. See Kamisar, supra note 40, at 1011; P. DEvIN, supra
note 166, at 183-84.
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tary active euthanasia consistent with ethical principles, a consti-
tutional defense to criminal liability predicated on a very clear
showing that all the requisite moral constraints are satisfied.10
The constitutional right to privacy rests, I have argued, on cer-
tain ethical principles of respect for personhood, and the court has
the appropriate role of elaborating the underlying moral right con-
sistent with its judicial capacities. But the court should not strain
its resources beyond its reasonable capacities, looking instead to
legislative reforms which better effectuate certain aspects of the
underlying right. 09 I do not suggest that the court should remain
supine in the area of voluntary active euthanasia or certain cases of
aiding and abetting suicide.4 10 The state of American law on these
questions is deeply wrong, remitting ultimate moral questions to
the discretion of prosecutors, judges, and juries and producing a
pattern of erratic and unjust results inconsistent with any defensi-
ble moral principle.41 1 The court should intervene in egregiously
clear cases and make it clear that deep constitutional principles are
flouted by the state of our law; but once it has done so, it should
make clear that legislatures bear responsibility as well to effectuate
the underlying rights.
408. Such a defense might apply only in the clearest cases of Glanville Williams' proposed
legislative defense. See G. WxuAlms, supra note 38, at 339-46.
409. Compare the role that legislative reform is playing in the area of Voluntary passivb
euthanasia. See note 325 supra.
410. Compare the Switzerland exemption from aiding and abetting suicide for physicians
in cases of patient request and terminal illness. See note 202 supra.
411. See note 203 supra. Compare the European practice. See note 202 supra.
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